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The signatories of the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) have called on a wide 
range of businesses ‘to apply their creativity and innovation’ to address sustainable 
development challenges. Yet the role of business in contributing to development depends 
profoundly on its interaction with the state. This paper asks how states and businesses 
interact in different contexts to shape development outcomes. A considerable literature has 
explored state–business relations in producing investment and growth, and the factors that 
make these relations effective. However, most of these studies either weakly reflect or fail to 
reflect: (a) the process of interactions and how these are shaped by, and at the same time 
shape, the power and interests of the actors involved; (b) different political and economic 
contexts; and (c) the implications of state–business relations beyond economic growth. The 
paper makes the case for analysing state–business relations beyond economic impacts, by 
considering the implications of these interactions for three defining challenges of the early 
twenty-first century – namely inequality, exclusion and environmental degradation. Through a 
review of four case studies from Chile, Tanzania, India and Ethiopia, the paper explores the 
actors, structures and processes of state–business relations, along with development 
outcomes achieved. We employ the concept of ‘negotiation’ as a metaphor to describe the 
ongoing interaction that is state–business relations, in order to move the frame of analysis 
towards a goal-oriented process and to highlight the importance of power and interests in 
relation to these goals. Building on the case studies, we suggest three ways forward to 
develop clearer models of state–business relations in development. These are:                   
(1) understanding state–business relations in different institutional contexts, how they 
emerge and how they operate, and their implications for development outcomes;                 
(2) identifying specific factors that shape the process of state–business relations; and            
(3) explaining developmental effectiveness of state–business relations, considering also 
trade-offs and contradictions between different development goals. The challenge of 
developing adequate frameworks for understanding constantly evolving state–business 
relations in development is large; but given renewed calls for states and businesses to work 
together for development, the issues identified here should expectably have a central place 
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State–business relations are ubiquitous in market economies. For at least two and a half 
centuries the economic and societal implications of these relationships have been a concern 
of scholarship (see, for example, Smith 1976 [1776]). More recently, the success of East 
Asian ‘developmental states’ – notably South Korea and Taiwan – has been studied as a 
case of effective state–business relations acting as catalysts for economic growth and 
structural transformation (White and Wade 1984; Evans 1996). Similarly, recent studies 
conducted in Africa and Asia claim that close and effective state–business relations reduce 
policy uncertainty, that the rate of investment increases, and that they determine economic 
growth and structural transformation (Cali and Sen 2011; Cali et al. 2011; Qureshi and Te 
Velde 2013; Lemma and Te Velde 2015). 
While much research is being done on state–business relations, the question of how state–
business relations lead to broader development outcomes beyond growth, such as 
reductions in inequality and poverty, or the promotion of sustainable development, has 
received comparably limited attention. Moreover, the question of the effectiveness of these 
relations in producing development outcomes in different institutional contexts is still far from 
conclusively answered. Important research is seeking to uncover or prescribe ‘correct’ or 
‘good’ state–business relations. Yet given the many ways in which the perceptions of the 
roles of states and businesses in development are evolving and the varied forms of 
interaction in different contexts, we find a significant research gap in taking stock of the 
state–business relations which exist in developing countries and a lack of frameworks for 
understanding them in relation to development outcomes. We seek to address, in a non-
deterministic and non-prescriptive way, this central issue of contemporary political economy. 
Not long ago, the signatories of the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)1 called on a 
wide range of businesses – from micro-enterprises to cooperatives to multinationals – ‘to 
apply their creativity and innovation’ to address the sustainable development challenges of 
ending poverty and hunger and reducing inequality. At the same time, ‘governments are 
expected to take ownership and establish national frameworks for the achievement of the   
17 Goals’.2 With contemporary development thinking and practice increasingly emphasising 
the role of business (Humphrey et al. 2014), we see a major gap in how the relationship of 
business with the state is posited. Statements like ‘how business does business, and where 
it does business, will have a significant impact on whether the Sustainable Development 
Goals are achieved’3 appear to position business as an autonomous core actor in 
development. Yet how and where ‘business does business’ depends profoundly on its 
interaction with the state, which acts not only as a regulator or partner, but also at times as 
facilitator, co-conspirator or adversary – and often more than one of these roles 
simultaneously. 
This Evidence Report therefore poses the question: how do the state and business interact 
to shape development outcomes? We hold the underlying premise that the interplay between 
states and businesses profoundly affects development outcomes, including and beyond 
growth, to be uncontroversial. While this interplay has been obscured in the heated debate 
over business-led or state-led models, where the private sector can be said to be a 
development actor, it is frequently responding to policy directions or incentives from the 
state, or using public finance. Where states engage in development activities, they very often 
act in cooperation with or through delegation of tasks to the private sector, or react to harms 
created by business activities. Given the centrality of state–business relations to 
                                                
1 https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/post2015/transformingourworld 
2 www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/development-agenda/ 
3 Helen Clark, speech at the UN Private Sector Forum, 26 September 2015. 
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development, we argue that understanding these relations, how they are structured and how 
they work in practice is crucial. 
These issues are broad and one challenge is to define the boundaries. Firstly, we are 
examining contemporary state–business relations (roughly the past 20 to 25 years), instead 
of a broader sweep of history. Secondly, we are interested in state–business relations in 
developing countries that are market economies (in the broader sense).4 Thirdly, we focus on 
interactions between states and businesses that shape (or seek to shape) development, 
meaning the deliberate promotion of developmental outcomes (we elaborate on 
developmental outcomes in Section 6). 
Within these bounds, this report aims to provide an academically grounded analysis relevant 
for the policy community (and those who advise or have the ear of the policy community) of 
existing conceptualisations and some insightful cases of how state–business relations shape 
development outcomes. Our approach consists of two components: first, a review of 
theoretical and empirical literature, and second, an examination of four case studies. Our 
literature review takes into account the contributions of different disciplines (notably political 
science and sociology) to understanding state–business relations, drawing out different 
perspectives on the power and interests involved in state–business relations in market 
economies. In particular, we focus on the Developmental States literature and recent works 
on ‘effective’ state–business relations for development, as well as examining a number of 
broader theoretical approaches. The literature ultimately points us to the importance of 
formal and informal coordination institutions, the notion of state–business relations as 
reflecting a balance of power, the potential value of a non-prescriptive approach to studying 
state–business relations, and the need to better understand processes in addition to 
structures of state–business relations. 
While the literature supports our conceptualisation of state–business relations, the case 
studies provide the details: who has been involved, what processes have been at work, and 
what outcomes have emerged. While primary data-based investigation was beyond the 
scope of this initial framing paper, researchers with rich and direct experience in a particular 
sector and country developed each case based on published sources. These are national 
studies from Chile, Ethiopia, India and Tanzania, while Box 5.1 also considers the 
international dimensions of state–business interactions through the examination of Chinese 
business in Africa. The large volume of evidence that emerged from the case studies was 
synthesised through an inductive reasoning process to interpret and structure the evidence. 
This synthesis captured emerging themes such as the interdependence of states and 
businesses, the fine line between collaboration and collusion, different forms or modalities of 
coordination, and the importance of ideas in shaping state–business relations. We are well 
aware of the limitations of these secondary cases, particularly in the investigation of 
processes in which interests, agendas and interactions are often hidden. Nevertheless, we 
believe that the evidence that emerges makes the case for the need for a better and more 
nuanced understanding of state–business relations in determining development outcomes in 
different institutional contexts, and provides a basis for future empirical work. 
1.1 Key concepts 
Many of the key concepts used in this report are contested, and while we don’t aim to resolve 
these debates, we outline below the particular ways these concepts are used here. 
                                                
4 By ‘developing countries’ we exclude European, North American and high-income Asian countries. Chile, one of our case 
studies, is a borderline case; but the case study deals with a period in which it was still rapidly economically developing. By 
‘market economies’ we only exclude the very few remaining centrally planned economies, such as North Korea and Cuba. 
7 
1.1.1 Development and development outcomes 
Economic growth is at the centre of much of the current literature on state–business 
relations. However, we consider investment and economic growth as central but insufficient 
components of development. We therefore focus on three additional defining development 
challenges of the early twenty-first century: reducing inequalities, such that the benefits of 
growth and existing wealth more evenly contribute to improved livelihoods and wellbeing; 
building inclusive and secure societies, where citizens are protected against shocks and 
have a stake in governance; and accelerating sustainability through development pathways 
that address resource demands and limits (IDS 2015). There are also potential trade-offs, 
contradictions and complexities between the pursuit of these different development goals (for 
example, Schmidt et al. 2015; Waage et al. 2015). We expand on these aspects of 
development, which resonate with many of the UN SDGs, in Section 5. 
1.1.2 State and business 
Defining the state is extremely challenging, and we return to this in our literature review. In 
this report, the state generally refers to a collection of actors (both organisations and 
individuals) with the legal mandate to represent populations, ranging from various ministries 
and the civil servants and politicians who work in them, to regulatory agencies or quasi-
autonomous bodies. In practice, it is often the constituent elements of the nation state that 
are meant, but state also consists of actors and agencies operating at different levels (local, 
sub-national, national).5 These actors have varying degrees of autonomy, and have their own 
interests, including attaining and maintaining power. In any case, our understanding of the 
state extends beyond mere government; rather, in the Weberian sense, it is the compulsory 
political organisation that remains even after various rulers, governments or administrations 
have come and gone (although they may profoundly shape it). 
We acknowledge therefore that in discussing specific examples of relations between state 
actors and business, such as those described in the case studies, we are often discussing 
government– rather than state–business relations. However, for simplicity and for 
consistency with use in most other papers, we use the term state–business relations 
throughout. 
As the literature review makes clear, business can be seen as synonymous with capital and 
the capitalist class; it can refer to individual firms or ‘businesses’, or to groups of businesses. 
In this review, ‘business’ refers to a diffuse collection of actors: business associations, 
multinational enterprises, small and medium-sized firms and individual entrepreneurs. These 
actors may operate in the formal or informal sector, range across agriculture, industry and 
services, and trade mostly domestically or operate across national borders. While all 
businesses are interested in profits, the profit orientation may be primary or, particularly in 
the case of social businesses, secondary. 
1.1.3 Power 
It is nigh impossible to discuss state–business relations without some reference to power. 
Yet the concept of power is extremely contested. For liberals, power is a force which controls 
(‘power over’) and which therefore requires checks and balances; whereas collectivists see 
power as constructive (‘power with’), a means of aggregating resources for the collective 
good (Moore 2005). Some treatments of power centre on specific episodes of coercion or 
collective action, while others focus on power as the outcome of social processes (Murdoch 
and Marsden 1994). Foucault’s conceptualisation is more dynamic. Power is a network of 
relations constantly in tension; a perpetual battle rather than a contract (Foucault 1991:     
26–7). Power may also be understood primarily in terms of its different manifestations. Fuchs 
                                                
5 In the present analysis, we do not include international or inter-governmental actors, and consider them rather as ‘other’ actors 
that influence state–business relations. 
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and Lederer (2007), for example, discuss the power of business in terms of instrumental 
power, focusing on the power and influence of business over other actors; structural power, 
which is determined by underlying economic structures and organisational procedures that 
allow businesses to set agendas before any interaction takes place; and the power of ideas 
and values that shape identity and perceptions of problems and potential solutions. 
Our understanding of power is partly instrumental, based on the actors involved and the 
resources they command in order to satisfy their preferences or interests. It is also highly 
structural, based on the agenda-setting power of the actors involved. Power may be 
employed both in the struggle for domination (power over) and to work with others towards 
common goals (power with). Power is not fixed but is shaped through social processes and 
interactions – an aspect we come back to in the next section. 
1.2 Overview 
Setting the context, the next section presents our lens on state–business relations as a 
structured process of negotiation, which is then followed by an overview of key theoretical 
and empirical literature on state–business relations. Both sections explore the concepts of 
power and interests as they influence and are influenced by the ongoing process of state–
business relations. Sections 4 and 5 present our case studies and our synthesis of the 
themes that emerge. The synthesis also explores how state–business relations have 
contributed to development outcomes, including economic development, reducing 
inequalities, building inclusive and secure societies and accelerating sustainability. We 




2 State–business relations: a structured 
process of ‘negotiation’ 
As the review in the next section will show, how states and businesses interact and the 
implications for society is a recurrent theme in political, economic and sociological thought. 
This report considers a subset of state–business interactions: that of state–business 
relations. In other words, the interactions that we are interested in are not one-off, discreet or 
arbitrary, but rather complex engagements over a longer period of time. We examine these 
relations through a specific lens, negotiation, which allows for a non-deterministic and non-
prescriptive analysis, providing scope to explore both structural features of negotiation, 
shaped by power and interests, and the processes through which they take place. 
To clarify, we do not mean negotiation in the narrowly literal sense of different parties sitting 
around a table to ‘hammer out’ an agreement. These discreet events are only part of the 
broader and longer-term negotiation that goes on between states and businesses. In the 
wider sense, negotiation is an analytical metaphor that focuses our view on the various ways 
in which states and businesses interact in pursuit of their interests. 
Our interest in negotiation is not unique. A number of other authors employ the concept. 
Evans (1995: 12) argues that developmental states engage business and society through 
‘the continual negotiation and renegotiation of goals and policies’. States engage in 
negotiation with business and labour in search of compromises over economic reforms 
(Schmidt 2009). Weiss (1995: 612) highlights how states in successful late developing 
countries exercised ‘infrastructural, or negotiated, powers’ vis-à-vis business. Haggard 
(1997: 83) argues against painting state–business relations in terms of an autonomous state 
and a relatively passive private sector, seeing them as negotiations through which the 
government seeks political support, investment and information, while business seeks a 
predictable and stable business environment and relevant incentives. However, nowhere do 
we find the idea of state–business relations as negotiation properly deepened. We therefore 
outline negotiation as our analytical lens here. 
2.1 Power and interests in negotiation 
While the power of state or business actors in their ongoing negotiation is difficult to observe 
and define precisely, their relative power (symmetrical or asymmetrical) can provide useful 
insights (Crump 2015). This includes instrumental power derived from the resources that 
they possess, as well as the skill with which they employ these resources and their structural 
power to set the boundaries of the negotiation. Moving from power to interests, the interests 
of businesses could simply be defined as profits, while the interests of state actors could be 
defined as power. However, the exact preferences of specific business or state actors within 
negotiations are shaped by the types (for example, sector or function) and scale (for 
example, local, national, international) of their activities, their incentive structures and the 
institutional framework and network of relations in which they operate, and can be seen as 
relatively aligned or divergent. If we consider the possible combinations of power and interest 
alignment or divergence that may exist in the negotiation between business and the state, we 
find the four extreme scenarios represented in Figure 2.1. 
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Figure 2.1 State–business relations based on power and interests 
 
Source: Authors’ own. 
On the right side of the diagram, states and businesses have more equal power: 
 At bottom right, similarly powerful actors with divergent interests are likely to engage 
in competition or conflict. In such a ‘states versus markets’ scenario, their 
irreconcilable goals lock the actors into entrenched competition for supremacy, with 
one seeking to dominate the negotiations at the expense of the other, but neither can 
succeed. Likely, both are weakened as a result. 
 At top right, under conditions of equal power and shared interests, the state and 
business are likely to work closely together. This scenario highlights the ‘constructive’ 
face of power, which may be broadly benevolent or nefarious, manifesting as 
collaboration or collusion. Collaboration implies a beneficent confluence of interests, 
where state–business relations result in practical solution-seeking; collusion refers to 
the possibility that state and business actors may collaborate to the detriment of 
broader society. 
The left side of the diagram represents situations with unequal power where ‘power over’ 
dominates; note that either states or businesses may have greater power: 
 At bottom left, divergent interests and unequal power suggest relations in which either 
business elites overpower and capture the state apparatus, which they manage to 
employ to advance their interests at the expense of societal interests, or a strong 
state may overpower and effectively control businesses (coercion); an approximate 
example could be Venezuela’s political economy in recent years. 
 In the top-left corner, integration and co-optation suggest the interests of unequal 
actors aligning, with the weaker actor becoming incorporated into or led by the other. 
The more evident example of this would be the state leading business and integrating 
it into its agendas, as with ‘state capitalism’, or state-owned enterprise. But also 
business might effectively co-opt and integrate a compliant state (or agencies of the 
state), for instance if powerful corporations manage to control the policy agenda of a 
developing state which has no autonomy. 
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However, we suggest that these extremes are archetypical and in reality, they constitute 
exceptions rather than the rule. As illustrated in Figure 2.2, they are in the extreme corners of 
the matrix. In the realm between these extremes, actors’ interests are different (although not 
100 per cent incompatible), and each has some (but not necessarily equal) influence over 
outcomes.6 In this realm, negotiation is necessary because each actor requires something 
from the other to achieve its goals. Here, conflict is averted or resolved and some degree of 
cooperation is achieved (though whether this is ‘collaboration’ or ‘collusion’ is a point that will 
be taken up later). While conflictual/competitive, collaborative/collusive, coercive/capturing, 
or integrating/co-opting situations do exist – in many instances real state–business relations 
will contain some elements of each, and sit in the much less clear space in the ‘middle’. 
Figure 2.2 The realm of negotiation 
 
Source: Authors’ own. 
2.2 Negotiation as process 
Figure 2.2 is static. If our analysis stopped here, the lens of negotiation would be 
meaningless. We would need to understand state–business relations in any particular 
context as having a pre-determined outcome based on the relative power and interests of the 
actors involved. Yet we understand power as being shaped by, as well as shaping, social 
processes. Actors’ orientations (their preferences and perceptions) too are shaped by the 
setting in which negotiation takes place and the ensuing exchange of ideas.7 Therefore, we 
need to consider analytically the process of negotiation alongside its structure. This view is in 
line with other theoretical approaches. It corresponds, for example, to that highlighted by 
Mayntz and Scharpf (1995) in their analysis of ‘actor-centred institutionalism’, in which 
structure and agency intermingle to shape political-economic outcomes and to elements of 
actor-network theory (Murdoch and Marsden 1994). 
  
                                                
6 This theoretical space may be seen as pertaining to a specific issue (such as how to address malnutrition) or general issues 
(such as national development). 
7 This premise stands in contrast to rational choice approaches that assume largely stable and fixed preferences. 
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In a review of negotiation theories performed for the Food and Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations (FAO), Alfredson and Cungu (2008) identify five relevant theoretical 
approaches to negotiation, primarily drawn from business and management literatures: 
 a structural approach, which explains negotiation as reflecting power structures 
between actors; outcomes can be predicted from actors’ pre-existing power 
 a strategic approach, which sees actors as rationally competitively bargaining, as in 
game-theoretic models 
 a behavioural approach, which highlights the effect of individual negotiators, their 
personal characteristics and framing of the situation; for instance ‘hard-liners’ or 
‘altruists’ 
 a concession-exchange approach, in which negotiating parties make trade 
concessions for counter-concessions 
 an integrative approach, which foregrounds the process of negotiation itself and the 
communication between the actors. In contrast to the other approaches, which 
presuppose a fixed ‘pie’ and rigid modalities, this emphasises the possibility of win-
win outcomes created through collective problem-solving. 
All five approaches may partly explain negotiations between state and business actors; 
however, the structural and strategic approaches are both very deterministic, the behavioural 
approach focuses too strongly (for our purposes) on negotiators’ personal attributes, while 
the concession-exchange approach is rigid and formulaic. We would suggest that, for 
understanding state–business relations in development, the integrative approach best 
supports an analysis of the iterative ‘games real actors play’ (Scharpf 1997) under conditions 
of uncertainty and with interdependent preferences. As the case studies in Section 4 will 
show, negotiation between states and businesses is very often about seeking – successfully 
or not – ways forward towards ‘win-win’ outcomes through the discovery of the other’s 
preferences, the building of trust and the identification of solutions (Lewicki et al. 2010:   
125–43). There are, of course, well-known perils along the way: the good faith of one actor 
may be taken advantage of, negotiators may lose accountability to their constituency (as with 
‘cognitive capture’ of regulators), or negotiation may be increasingly pursued for its own sake 
(Lewicki et al. 2010: 37). Moreover, adopting this integrative perspective says nothing about 
the impact of potential win-win solutions on broader society – they may be beneficial or 
detrimental to the actors outside the negotiation. 
By seeing state–business relations through the lens of the ‘structured process’ of negotiation, 
we move the focus away from the four extreme corners of Figure 2.2 to shine a light on the 
process of negotiation in between, in which structural conditions are key factors, but not final 
determinants of, the state–business relations which shape development. If structure was all 
that mattered, negotiation itself would be meaningless, a foregone conclusion; but if only the 
process mattered, this would deny the ability of powerful and strongly interested actors to 
influence and shape both the scope of negotiation and the outcomes achieved. In the 
structured process of negotiation, states and businesses have power, interests and agency, 
and pursue (but do not necessarily attain) mutually acceptable ways forward, with 
implications for society more broadly. 
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3 Conceptualisation of state–business 
relations 
The power and interests of state and business, and how they relate to one another, are the 
subjects of a vast array of literature. Already Adam Smith’s analyses actually went far 
beyond his famous idea of the ‘invisible hand’8 governing the economy, and with laissez-faire 
only part of the story. Smith in fact suggested that the state should steer business activity 
through selective taxation, and furthermore provide infrastructure, money, public services 
and even on occasion engage in public enterprise for revenue generation (Smith 1976 
[1776]; Viner 1927).9 Marx’s writings also understood the modern state and capital as being 
in a dialectical and interdependent relationship with one another, shaped by the balance of 
class interests (Elster 1985: 400–28).10 
Since then, very many authors and schools of thought have reflected on the nature of the 
state and business and their relation to one another. The aim of this review is to assess the 
state of play in the literature that deals with state–business relations in development, asking: 
how do power and interests shape state–business relations? Presented with a potentially 
vast literature to review, we focus on two particular streams of research: the literature on the 
‘developmental state’, and more recent literature that analyses the ‘effectiveness’ of state–
business relations in different countries. These offer key insights into the ways in which 
interactions are organised in different countries. But with their focus on the creation of 
institutions for coordination of business and state interests – effectively the bottom-left corner 
in Figure 2.1 – they do not address some questions around the structure (power and 
interests) and processes of negotiation. We therefore also draw on selected insights from 
broader theory to dig deeper into the nature of the state and business, the interests they may 
have and the powers at their disposal. We acknowledge that our review does not do justice 
to the full body of relevant scholarship. We have missed out literatures on private sector 
development, industrial policy and innovation studies, which consider how states can drive 
investment, growth and structural change. However, we believe our chosen scope is 
appropriate in the context of our question regarding how power and interests shape state–
business relations and their implications for broader development outcomes. 
3.1 Developmental states and embedded autonomy 
The concept of the developmental state arose from the need to explain the economic growth 
of several East Asian countries – specifically Japan, South Korea and Taiwan – at 
phenomenal rates while diverging from both free-market and socialist planning growth 
strategies. Chalmers Johnson was the first to elaborate the concept11 in MITI and the 
Japanese Miracle: The growth of industrial policy, 1925–1975. Johnson (1982: 17) stressed 
that ‘all states intervene in their economies’, and clarified that Japan was perhaps exemplary, 
but not unique. ‘In states that were late to industrialize, the state itself led the industrialization 
drive, that is, it took on developmental functions’ (Johnson 1982: 19). The state here acts as 
the organising force driving economic upgrading by national business. 
                                                
8 Smith only employed this metaphor once in The Wealth of Nations, and not to illustrate the power of unfettered trade, but 
rather in a discussion of economic protectionism, as an illustration of how societal biases towards buying domestic goods 
benefited the national economy (see also, Kennedy 2009). 
9 According to one of his foremost interpreters, Jacob Viner (1927: 231), Smith ‘was not a doctrinaire advocate of laissez-faire. 
He saw a wide and elastic range of activity for government, and he was prepared to extend it even farther if government […] 
showed itself entitled to wider responsibilities’. 
10 The young Marx evaluated the state as simply a capitalist apparatus (Marx and Engels 2004), but he later revised this to a 
more nuanced view of the state as an autonomous body that was variously tolerated, employed or ‘abdicated’ by collective 
business (capitalists). In Marx’ historical analysis in Capital, the state originally created the conditions for the emergence of 
modern capitalist economic relations (particularly Ch. 26 & 33 – Marx 1990: 873–77; 931–41). 
11 However, according to Evans (1989), researchers associated with the Institute of Development Studies were the first to dub 
Taiwan and South Korea ‘developmental states’, and hence coined the term (see also White and Wade 1984). 
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3.1.1 What is a developmental state? 
Key to the success of any developmental state, Johnson (1982: 20–22) argued, was the 
existence of a powerful and talented economic bureaucracy leading business to contribute to 
the national industrialisation drive, much in line with Weber’s (1978) notion of an effective 
bureaucracy as the key to rational exercise of authority. Johnson’s subsequent writings 
(1999: 43) highlight the abstract nature of the developmental state model – not a Japanese 
or Asian specificity – and how it could be generalised. In its strong form, the developmental 
state concept (or hypothesis) contends that, in order to industrialise, any country requires a 
strong and capable state to lead the private sector with an industrial policy that enhances the 
nation’s competitiveness. In its softer form, it suggests that an effective state with a rational 
plan can significantly accelerate economic development.12 
Linda Weiss’ (1995) study of Korea, Taiwan and Japan highlights that state ‘strength’ and 
bureaucratic ‘autonomy’ are not enough for a state to become developmental. Rather, 
developmental states possess bureaucracies that are strong and insulated from special 
interests, but not insular from the economy as a whole. Business and the state must relate to 
each other through ‘governed interdependence’. The power of the state in successful late 
developers thus is not ‘despotic’, but rather, ‘infrastructural’. Weiss suggests that four forms 
of governed interdependence are found in East Asian developmental states: ‘disciplined 
support’, where support for business comes attached to performance conditions; ‘public risk 
absorption’, where the state lowers the risk of establishing new or emerging industries; 
‘private-sector initiative in public policies’, business shaping the state or colluding with it; and 
finally, ‘public-private innovation alliances’ around acquiring, developing, upgrading and 
diffusing technology (Weiss 1995: 607–11). 
Evans (1995) refers to the same interrelationship of state and business as ‘embedded 
autonomy’. Developmental states, he argues, have a bureaucratic apparatus which is 
autonomous as a coherent entity that remains separate from society, with its own 
meritocratic rules, but which is embedded ‘in a concrete set of social ties that binds the state 
to society and provides institutionalized channels for the continual negotiation and 
renegotiation of goals and policies’ (Evans 1995: 12). Evans suggests that in this way 
developmental states succeed at overcoming or ‘fusing’ what at first sight appears to be a 
contradiction between autonomy and embeddedness. 
Embeddedness provides sources of intelligence and channels of implementation that 
enhance the competence of the state. Autonomy complements embeddedness, 
protecting the state from piecemeal capture, which would destroy the cohesiveness of 
the state itself and eventually undermine the coherence of its social interlocutors. The 
state’s corporate coherence enhances the cohesiveness of external networks and 
helps groups that share its vision overcome their own collective action problems. Just 
as predatory states deliberately disorganize society, developmental states help 
organize it. 
(Evans 1995: 248) 
It has, however, been pointed out that bureaucratic structure alone cannot explain 
developmental states. Leftwich (2000: 167–68) underscores that a developmental state must 
demonstrate ‘a determination and ability to stimulate, direct, shape and cooperate with the 
domestic private sector as well as arrange mutually acceptable deals with foreign interests’. 
The form of authority exercised in business may also matter. 
                                                
12 These ideas are older, harking back at least to German nineteenth-century economist Friedrich List, who contended that less 
advanced nations had to rely on the state to drive future development and catch up with advanced nations. List situated his 
ideas in a broader framework of ‘national economics’ (as opposed to Smith’s liberal economics), arguing that Germany take a 
‘state-led’ approach to push through the stages of economic development and catch up with Britain (List 1885/2011).  
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Some developmental state theorists point to crucial elements of ideology and state 
commitment. A state with a ‘developmentalist’ ideology is one whose main focus is improving 
its citizens’ welfare through economic development, usually interpreted as high rates of 
accumulation and industrialisation. Castells (1992: 55) argues that such a state ‘establishes 
as its principle of legitimacy its ability to promote sustained development, understanding by 
the steady high rates of economic growth’. It may succeed if this interest aligns with the 
interests of business to make profits; but the state must also have enough (though perhaps 
not too much) power to promote its strategy. 
Laura Routley’s (2012) review of the literature summarises the attributes of developmental 
states as: first, having a capable, autonomous but embedded bureaucracy; second, political 
leadership oriented towards development; third, a close and often symbiotic relationship 
between (at least some) state agencies and key industries; and fourth, successful policies 
which promote growth. She highlights that a truly developmental state must not only possess 
the capacity to perform developmental roles, but must also use it; elements which certainly 
can exist independently from one another. To paraphrase Routley, to be truly developmental, 
a state must show good bureaucracy, good leadership, good relationships and good policy, 
and direct these in practice towards economic development. 
3.1.2 Confusions and limitations 
Routley (2014), among others, has warned that the ‘developmental state’ may increasingly 
be used as a buzzword, particularly by politicians outside East Asia, losing its meaning as a 
fully-fledged model. Others have highlighted the divergence in discussions about the relative 
importance of different parts of the developmental state model (Evans 2011: 51; Booth 2015: 
3), which could lead to the term being appropriated for very different state structures which 
are not developmental in nature, or at least have little in common with the original archetype. 
Conversely, some have also asked whether the concept may be tautological if the label 
‘developmental state’ is applied post-hoc to any state that has successfully developed, rather 
than to states that show distinctive features (Mkandawire 2001). 
Putzel (2002) highlights that the search for an East Asian developmental state model 
‘homogenised’ the experiences of diverse nations, which may not have had a singular reason 
for success. Haggard (2004: 56) extends this criticism by arguing that ‘the misguided effort to 
find a single institutional taproot’ for East Asia’s growth has led to a simplified understanding 
which does not account for regional variances. Hayashi (2010) contends that by focusing on 
the widely discussed East Asian examples, many lessons from other states (such as South-
east Asian states) have often been ignored, although these countries and their development 
paths may be more relevant to current developing countries. Moreover, the focus on a few 
countries which enjoyed economic success often gives a rose-tinted view that obscures not 
only many failed cases, but also the social injustice and political repression which 
characterised post-war development in cases like South Korea and Taiwan, where the power 
and interests of state and business often superseded civil rights. 
The developmental state concept has also been criticised for framing discussions around 
what ‘works’ for development too narrowly, around a few structural factors and explanations 
which neglect the history of a country or the context in which it found itself at the time its 
developmental state was ‘active’ (Woo-Cummings 1999: 2). It is argued that this focus on 
institutions misses the impact that politics and social processes can have on development. 
Institutions for coordination may well manage to address operational issues in a country’s 
economy, but such coordination assumes that state and business have reasonably shared 
interests and a distribution of power that makes collaboration (rather than control or 
domination) likely. Leftwich (2010: 94) also highlights the importance of leaders, elites and 
coalitions exercising the ‘right’ sort of agency, which structure alone cannot explain. 
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3.2 Cross-country comparisons of formal and informal state–
business relations 
A body of literature has more recently emerged, which specifically deals with the 
effectiveness of ‘state–business relations’ in development, deepening the thesis that 
developmental state–business relations are characterised by ‘embedded autonomy’ or 
otherwise close and beneficent collaboration. This literature explicitly has sought to transfer 
and apply the lessons of East Asian developmental states to other regions. This ‘effective 
state–business relations’ literature highlights that close state–business relations reduce 
policy uncertainty, raising the rate of investment and bringing about economic growth and 
structural transformation (Cali and Sen 2011; Cali et al. 2011; Qureshi and Te Velde 2013; 
Lemma and Te Velde 2015). Coordination is a core theme – that is, the ability of state and 
business organisations to exchange information and align incentives, to reduce transaction 
costs and to lead to growth-oriented policy implementation. 
3.2.1 Formal institutions and ‘good’ state–business relations 
Much of this literature emerged from the Research Programme Consortium on Improving 
Institutions for Pro-Poor Growth (IPPG),13 which argued from an economic perspective that 
effective or ‘good’ state–business relations were those that addressed government, market 
and coordination failures and reduced policy uncertainty. 
Good state-business relations are based on a benign collaboration between business 
and the state with positive mechanisms that enable transparency, ensure the 
likelihood of reciprocity; increase credibility of the state among the capitalists, and 
establish high levels of trust between public and private agents. They provide a 
transparent way of sharing information, lead to a more appropriate allocation of 
resources, remove unnecessary obstacles to doing business, and provide checks and 
balances on government intervention. 
(Te Velde 2009: 5, emphasis in original) 
In terms of evidence to support the suggestion that such state–business relations drive 
growth, researchers have conducted various cross-country quantitative comparisons and 
assembled case study evidence from individual countries. Sen and Te Velde (2009) scored 
19 different sub-Saharan African countries according to the quality of their state–business 
relations, awarding higher scores to those that had: 
(i) greater private sector organisation vis-à-vis the public sector (the presence of 
umbrella business organisations/associations capable of lobbying the state) 
(ii) public sector organisation to support the private sector (the presence of an 
investment promotion agency) 
(iii) regularised interactions between government and the private sector (an 
institutionalised public–private dialogue taking place at regular intervals) 
(iv) mechanisms to avoid harmful collusion between the state and the private sector 
(having a competition policy). 
They found that countries that had these characteristics witnessed higher economic output, 
since ‘improvements in formalised institutional relations between the state and the private 
sector increase economic growth in the African context’ (Sen and Te Velde 2009: 1,278). 
The composite score for ‘effective’ state–business relations was further refined and applied 
in subsequent studies (Cali and Sen 2011; Cali et al. 2011; Qureshi and Te Velde 2013). Cali 
and Sen (2011) and Cali et al. (2011: 1,543) set out to examine ‘the impact of effective state-
business relations on economic growth’ in 15 Indian states. Applying the above measures 
                                                
13 www.ippg.org.uk/ 
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and standard growth regression methods, they concluded that the form of state–business 
relations significantly explained economic growth. Cali and Sen (2011: 1,543) added that 
more than any other conventional determinant of growth (such as geography or access to the 
sea), effective state–business relations explained differences in economic growth. 
Qureshi and Te Velde (2013) approached the issue from a firm’s perspective, looking at 
whether effective state–business relations (understood in this case as firms’ membership of 
business associations and their perception of government quality) improved firm-level 
performance in seven sub-Saharan countries: Benin, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Malawi, 
Mauritius, South Africa and Zambia. They found that membership in a business association 
enhanced firm-level productivity by about 25 to 35 per cent (Qureshi and Te Velde 2013: 
925), thanks, for instance, to associated firms having better access to information on 
regulations and to public goods. Overall, they suggested organised state–business relations 
improved a country’s investment climate and enhanced its labour productivity. 
Lemma and Te Velde’s (2015) review of empirical studies in Asia and Africa confirmed that 
high scores on formal state–business relations measures were associated with higher 
economic growth and firm-level productivity. Many case studies also emphasise the 
importance of formal interactions between business associations and their public-sector 
counterparts. For example, studies from Ghana, Mauritius, South Africa and Zambia showed 
that formal consultative forums performed multiple functions, including enabling businesses 
to transparently influence government budget decisions (Te Velde and Leftwich 2010). 
Overall, there appears to be a trend towards greater formalisation of state–business relations 
in Africa, such as Presidential Investor’s Advisory Councils being set up to engage with 
business (Lemma and Te Velde 2015). 
These findings, produced as part of the IPPG Consortium, suggest that economic growth 
depends on the extent to which states’ and businesses’ interests are aggregated and 
formally negotiated (IPPG 2010). However, some doubts have also recently been raised over 
the importance of centralised formal organisations in maintaining ‘good’ state–business 
relations. For instance, drawing on survey data from 171 local firms in Kenya, Tanzania and 
Zambia, Charles et al. (2015) explored how these firms engaged with the government. They 
found that a significant number of firms (as high as 50 per cent in Kenya) did not participate 
in business associations, and when they did, they tended to go with more than one 
association, splitting and weakening their voices and engagement with governments. These 
results resonate with Taylor’s (2012) suggestion that statistical measures may overstate the 
roles of business associations. 
3.2.2 Beyond formal institutions 
While the policy recommendations have naturally included supporting business associations, 
investment climate reforms, investment facilitation, public–private dialogue mechanisms and 
the creation of special economic zones (Sen 2015), much of what really lies behind ‘good’ 
state–business relations may not be formal or measurable. It is acknowledged that formal 
institutions are not easily put in place, and that informal state–business relations might be a 
stepping stone towards formalisation. Researchers from the Centre for the Future State14 
addressed these issues based on case study analyses from countries such as Brazil, China, 
Egypt, Indonesia and Vietnam, placing a much greater emphasis on informal rather than 
formal institutions. Abdel-Latif and Schmitz (2009), for example, found that informal 
relationships (social networks with common social roots and professional backgrounds) 
facilitated effective public–private relationships that played a role in raising investment and 
economic growth in Egypt. 
                                                
14 www2.ids.ac.uk/futurestate/ 
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In understanding how to achieve effective interactions of state and business, Unsworth and 
Moore (2010) even suggest that Weber’s (1978) ideal of a depersonalised and purely 
meritocratic bureaucracy may have been taken ‘too far’: 
Informal arrangements and personalised relationships can also be part of the 
solution, with potential to contribute over the longer term to more inclusive, rules-
based arrangements. Elements of ‘public authority’ – the provision of collective goods 
– can be created outside the state, for example when trust between businesspeople 
substitutes for legal enforcement of contracts. They can also be created through 
informal collaboration between public and private actors. 
(Unsworth and Moore 2010: 8) 
One conclusion from the Centre for the Future State is that state–business relations reflect a 
balance of power between different interests, which may be formally or informally negotiated. 
Bargaining between groups that hold political/military power (but need revenue, finance and 
investment) and those who hold economic power (who need order, security, infrastructure 
and predictability) is fundamental both to political settlements and for strategies for 
investment and growth. While the authors are sensitive to the risk of crony-capitalism, they 
emphasise the importance of examining how state–business relations work in practice, rather 
than condemning all informal relationships as collusion. At the same time, they note an 
interplay between formal and informal, and suggest that while informal institutions can be of 
great importance for short-term growth, sustaining growth requires more rules-based 
governance (Unsworth 2010). 
To appraise these recent literatures: they have provided valuable demonstrations of how 
state–business relations matter for growth, and have clearly shown the importance of formal 
arrangements that allow states and business to engage one another, as well as asking 
whether informal arrangements may stand in for (or help foster) formal ones. However, both 
literatures have dealt with development outcomes primarily in the form of economic growth, 
even where specified as ‘pro-poor growth’, rather than through a wider lens, and still tend 
towards an emphasis either primarily or ideally on formal interactions and institutions. 
3.3 Theoretical perspectives on the political economy of state 
and business 
This deeper look into the theoretical literature from political economy and sociology deepens 
the questions around power and interests that shape state–business relations. What power 
and interests does the state have, what power and interests does business have, and what 
relationship exists (or should exist) between the state and other economic actors in capitalist 
or market economies? 
3.3.1 Varieties of Capitalism 
One literature that theorises the relations of businesses with each other explains different 
‘Varieties of Capitalism’ (VoC).15 Its core hypothesis is that national economies diverge in 
important ways because institutional arrangements in different spheres of the economy only 
make sense when they fit together. Both businesses and states have an interest in 
institutional coherence, since ‘institutions within a successful economy are mutually 
reinforcing, balanced, and complementing’ (Nölke and Vliegenhart 2009: 672). 
Hall and Soskice (2001) originally proposed two types of capitalist economies: liberal market 
economies (LMEs) – typified by the United States and the United Kingdom – and coordinated 
                                                
15 The VoC literature has focused primarily on selected rich countries. It emerged in part as a reaction to popular notions about 
an inevitable global convergence towards market liberalism in the aftermath of the Cold War (Fukuyama 1992; Friedman 1999), 
and sought to explain the persistent differences in how successful capitalist economies are organised. 
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market economies (CMEs) – typified by Germany, Japan and Sweden. In LMEs, the 
activities of economic actors are coordinated mainly through market institutions, creating an 
economy organised through competition and formal contracting; in CMEs, strategic and 
longer-term network-based interaction between firms and other actors plays a greater role. 
The VoC typology has since been expanded extensively (and contestedly), but for us the 
framework of analysis is of far greater interest than the number of different varieties. The 
logic of VoC analysis may best be understood by focusing on the two original varieties (LME 
and CME). 
While in VoC thinking the key unit of analysis is the economy of nation states, the key 
explanatory unit is in fact the firm and its relations (Hancké 2009: 8). Firms must enter into 
relationships with a range of other actors (in order to produce and sell goods or services), 
and therefore they encounter a number of different coordination problems. These can be 
resolved in either liberal/market-based ways or in coordinated/non-market ways: 
 Industrial relations – how firms coordinate bargaining over wages and working 
conditions. Wage negotiations in LMEs to take place more often at the firm rather 
than sector, industrial or national levels, which is where they occur in CMEs (due to 
stronger trade unions). 
 Vocational training and education – how firms secure a suitable workforce, and how 
workers decide on investing in skills. LME workers tend to have more general, 
transferable skills, allowing them to switch jobs more easily, while in CMEs workers 
have more specific skills tailored to an employer or industry. 
 Corporate governance – how firms are financed and controlled. LME firms are funded 
more through share investments, and therefore pay attention to their capital market 
valuation, while in CMEs, firms have access to more patient capital thanks to dense 
networks which link them to investors or banks; this allows them to invest in longer-
term projects based on incremental innovation. 
 Inter-firm relations – how firms coordinate with suppliers and buyers. In LMEs, 
relationships between firms are based on markets and spot contracts, while in CMEs, 
relationships are more based on longer-term partnerships that encourage technology 
transfer.16 
 Employee relationships – how firms elicit employees’ cooperation and ensure their 
competency. In LMEs, firms rely on employees’ transferable skills and shorter 
contracts (hiring and firing), while in CMEs, firms foster specific skills and have 
longer-term employment contracts and stronger workforce representation in decision-
making. 
The key explanation for these differences is that arrangements for solving one coordination 
problem will be congruent with certain arrangements for another. For instance, a firm with 
longer-term, patient capital will have a greater interest in entering into longer-term contracts 
with more specialised employees, and will engage in longer-term arrangements with buyers 
and suppliers – which again strengthens the case for longer-term capital, and so on. These 
complementarities, Hall and Soskice argue, explain why entire countries come to have 
distinct varieties of capitalism. The ‘comparative institutional advantage’ of certain 
arrangements then leads nations to specialise in producing certain goods and services, and 
to follow different trajectories of innovation – radical innovation in LMEs, incremental in 
CMEs. 
Strikingly absent from this explanation is the state, however, as Schmidt (2009) points out. In 
her call for ‘bringing the state back in yet again’, she argues that a third distinct variety should 
                                                
16 In LMEs, technology and knowledge transfers happen more often through transfer (poaching) of personnel. 
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be recognised: state-influenced market economies,17 such as France, Italy, Spain, Korea and 
Taiwan (which includes two countries understood as developmental states). But also, 
Schmidt points out that in all varieties of capitalism the state has power over the institutional 
arrangements that the VoC framework generally derives from firms’ interests and 
interactions. The state matters in four key ways: 
 it constitutes a setting in which economic actors act (the nation state and its borders) 
 the polity of the state (its form, for instance centralised or dispersed/federal) affects 
the economy 
 the state makes economic policy (substantive political activity: faire, laissez-faire, etc.) 
 the state is politics (an arena of discourse over the practicalities and principles of how 
the economy works). 
Thus, the VoC literature offers poignant insights into why countries may not only have very 
different business–business relations, but also very different state–business relations. These 
depend on the way the state structurally acts as a setting and is constituted, but also which 
interests are reflected in the policy processes of the state and how the power of state politics 
shapes business. 
Given its origins in explaining the political economy of successful (i.e. rich) capitalist 
countries, some caution may be advised in taking cues from the VoC framework for our 
analysis. But the proposition of ‘institutional comparative advantage’ is very compelling and 
focuses our attention onto how state–business relations may not only be shaped by 
institutions, but also may create institutional settings which either reduce firms’ coordination 
problems (through creating coherent institutions) or exacerbate them (through institutions 
that contradict each other). For instance, while a developing country’s government may have 
a logical interest in fostering specialist skills development and stable labour relationships, this 
might fail to create growth or employment if the main employers are footloose firms that 
operate on short-term inter-firm contracts and are financed by impatient capital. State–
business relations, the VoC literature suggests, shape institutional coherence. 
3.3.2 State authority 
Bob Jessop (2001) summarises half a century of theorising about the state, and concludes it 
to be ‘an emergent, partial and unstable system that is interdependent with other systems in 
a complex social order’ (Jessop 2001: 166–67). The power of states under capitalism is far 
from absolute, and their interests are indeterminate and interdepend with others’. The review 
concludes with five themes which offer highly valuable pointers for us: firstly, to pay attention 
to the heterogeneity of different states; secondly, that states have differing capacity which 
shapes how they can negotiate with businesses; thirdly, globalisation has seen some 
businesses truly ‘go global’, while states have generally retained a national jurisdiction; 
fourthly, the changing scale of politics means that important interactions between state and 
business now also happen at the supra-national level; fifth, many regulatory and political 
factors shaping business fall into a grey area of ‘governance’, characterised by neither 
government hierarchy nor market anarchy. Yet while such a contextualisation of the state is 
important, it draws attention away from its unique authority. Weber (1978: 54) famously 
defined the state as that body which possessed the ‘monopoly of the legitimate use of 
physical force’ to enforce its order,18 and in his oeuvre on the relationships between economy 
and society he placed a key focus on the state. Yet while Weber never systematically 
                                                
17 These are characterised by a strong role of the state in shaping the economy – in a positive or a hindering manner – for 
instance, by shaping industrial relations or orchestrating reforms and adjustments to promote economic competitiveness. In 
such economies, it is the state rather than the interactions of firms that determines the shape of (for instance) employer–union 
relations, corporate finance or firms’ skills regimes. 
18 While this is the defining feature of the state, it by no means suggests violence to be the sole or most common method of 
statecraft for Weber. 
21 
clarified the relationship between state and economy,19 his thinking about the different types 
of authority, and his theorisation of modern state bureaucracies have proven to be lasting 
influences particularly on normative analyses of state–business relations. 
Weber (1978: 216–45) argued there were three types of ‘legitimate’ authority: rational, or 
legally justified; traditional (i.e. it has always been done this way); and charismatic, built on 
devotion to individual leaders. Rational authority was central to modernity, Weber (1978: 
224) contended, because capitalist production has an ‘urgent need for stable, strict, intensive 
and calculable administration’, and bureaucratic administration is key to the exercise of 
rational authority. He highlighted that rational-legal authority was the quintessential modern 
form of administration for nation-states and business organisations alike, being predictable 
and goal-rational, unlike charismatic and traditional rule.20 A rational bureaucracy, in Weber’s 
(1978: 220–1) definition, is characterised by a well-defined hierarchy, meritocratic 
recruitment, professionalism (career administrators), and decisions being bound by clearly 
defined rules (the decision-makers have little effectively to decide). 
Evans and Rauch (1999) found that the ‘Weberianness’ of states (operationalised in their 
case only as meritocratic recruitment and predictable long-term career rewards) is indeed an 
important, empirically measurable determinant of countries’ GDP growth. Drawing on 
Weber’s theories, the quality of bureaucracies – their ability to effectively translate 
government decisions into action – is an important factor in shaping state–business relations. 
Not only do Weberian states have more ability to exert power, but also a predictable, 
meritocratic state apparatus is likely a far better partner (or master) for business than a 
poorly functioning bureaucracy. 
3.3.3 Business authority 
Lindblom (1977) also refers to state hierarchy and authority. He points out that even in 
authoritarian states there are rarely times when one leader at the apex of a pyramid exerts 
power in a linear fashion down the hierarchy; in reality, multiple branches of government 
influence decisions, often with specialised authorities or personnel that cut across them. In 
market systems, power is further dispersed since states cannot, for example, mandate 
investment. In these systems, business is also an ‘authority’ that makes choices around 
technology, the organisation and structure of work and markets, and resource allocation. 
Public affairs (decisions that affect society) are in practice determined by two sets of 
authorities – state and business – which both have power and both pursue their own 
interests. As a result of this interdependence, ‘mutual adjustment among authorities’ is 
required in which each actor uses means such as exchange, persuasion and favours to 
influence the other, as in a process of negotiation. ‘Collaboration and deference’ between 
these authorities is therefore at the heart of politics (Lindblom 1977: 175). 
While Lindblom’s analysis explains forcefully why state–business relations matter, Haggard 
et al. (1997) contend that this structural power of capital in market economies is not the 
whole story. While all capitalists may share some interests, such as the protection of private 
property or policies that encourage investment, on many (if not most) issues, there are 
divergent interests, for instance between sectors or between firms (exporters versus 
importers) in one sector. Table 3.1 outlines five ways in which, following Haggard et al. 
(1997), business and its relations with states are conceptualised. It shows how the different 
                                                
19 In fact, his few direct statements on the matter may even be misleading. In his exploration of how political bodies are funded, 
for instance, Weber argued that revenue-raising (taxation) was the key connection between the state and business (Weber 
1978: 194). 
20 Charismatic and traditional authority continue to exist, however, and may play a very important role in shaping state–business 
relations. Some stories of successful national late capitalist development, for instance, hinge on the charismatic authority of 
‘father of the nation’ figures, such as Lee Kwan Yew in Singapore. While traditional authority is likely to hinder development and 
change, nonetheless some resource-rich traditionalist monarchies have also grown rapidly. 
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levels of aggregation or disaggregation of ‘business’ matter in shaping (and analysing) its 
relations with the state. The table begins with the most aggregated viewpoints. 
Table 3.1 Theories of business 
Business as ‘capital’	  All businesses share the same interests. 
 Capital ‘votes twice’: through lobbying, and deciding on investment. 
 The structural power of capital constrains the state; however, this can be 
positive where it constrains a predatory state.	
Business as ‘sector’	  Sector composition and representation in the political system affect 
state–business relations. 
 Business sectors share common interests; however, the free-rider 
problem means that businesses do not necessarily act collectively. 
 Contending interests of different sectors constrain the state.	
Business as ‘firm’	  Firm size (concentration) and diversity (conglomeration) matter. 
 Multi-sector conglomerates have diverse interests and may support 
changing policy priorities. 
 Ownership and how firms acquire capital (family, foreign, shareholder) 
may also be important.	
Business as 
‘association’	
 Business associations matter: if a small number of businesses with large 
economic weight organise, their power is great. 
 Associations can be rent-seeking but ‘encompassing multi-sectoral 
associations’ can limit pursuit of particularistic interests.	
Business  
(and government)  
as ‘network’	
 Embedded autonomy and the developmental state. 
 Networks between business and government can represent clientelism. 
 Repeated interaction leads to trust and cooperation, but no guarantee of 
‘good’ policy. 
 Sanctions ensure compliance (avoiding free-rider problems).	
Source: Authors’ own, based on Haggard et al. (1997: 38–57). 
The perspectives of Lindblom and Haggard et al. serve as a reminder that, in market 
economies, an analysis of state–business relations which focuses only on state authority and 
its capacity to coordinate and influence business misses the interactions which mediate 
states’ and businesses’ power and their interests. Business must also be understood as an 
‘authority’ in the sense of having the power to make decisions that affect the public. Yet 
neither business nor the state is monolithic, and an ongoing process of mutual adjustment, or 
negotiation, shaped by how their interests are aggregated, leads to policy outcomes. 
3.3.4 State–business relations and the balance of power 
With both state and business exercising authority, state–business relations appear as a 
terrain of contestation over who shapes the economy and its trajectory. This point is made 
strongly by Mariana Mazzucato (2013), whose thesis of an ‘entrepreneurial state’ as the core 
driver of innovation (in the United States) points to the interdependence and power struggles 
in state–business relations. While government spending fuelled America’s economic 
leadership through breakthrough technologies, for instance in digital innovation (among other 
things through research funds, incentives and technology transfers), the state has been 
unsuccessful at negotiating for its share of the subsequent spoils. 
The question of relative state–business power in shaping innovation (as part of economic 
development) harks back to Joseph Schumpeter’s (2003 [1942]) foregrounding of the figure 
of the entrepreneur as the driver of ‘creative destruction’. Schumpeter believed – much like 
Marx – that capital tended over time to centralise into trusts and monopolies, and therefore 
gradually the heroic, dynamic type of entrepreneurs who had shaped earlier stages of 
capitalist development would be disempowered by technocratic corporate and state 
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bureaucracies. However, as Alexander Ebner (2009) shows, Schumpeter noted the state 
could play a key role in economic development through facilitating entrepreneurship, and 
even sometimes act entrepreneurially itself – as Mazzucato has elucidated – to overcome 
collective action problems in innovation and to encourage innovation and technology 
adoption via selective financing (Ebner 2009: 373–5).21 But Schumpeter feared this would 
come at the expense of private sector entrepreneurship, with a more powerful state stifling 
the interests of businessmen. 
Marx broadly regarded the state as a manager of the class balance under capitalism (Elster 
1985: 426), a notion fleshed out by many theorists including Antonio Gramsci. Gramsci’s 
writings suggest states and businesses are interdependent and pursue their aims through a 
combination of coercion and consent, strongly suggestive of an ongoing process of 
negotiation between entities with power and interests. A Gramscian reading of different 
economic formations – such as Fordism, developmentalism and neoliberalism, as well as 
different national development models22 – suggests these to be temporary historical 
compromises between different forces in society, which take the shape of distinct state–
business relations. Gramsci warned against misreading the state as an autonomous steering 
entity (Gramsci et al. 1998: 243-5), and referred to this ‘fetishism’ as ‘statolatry’ (Gramsci et 
al. 1988: 237–8); a fallacy which, interestingly, both neoliberal and state-led theories of 
development fall for when they assume state and business can be separated. 
Another key line of thought suggestive of state–business relations as power balances comes 
from Karl Polanyi, whose idea of social embeddedness has gained considerable traction in 
political economy. Polanyi’s embeddedness notion goes beyond the more familiar idea of 
market transactions requiring trust, mutual understanding and legal enforcement (Block 
2001: xxiv), and rather suggests market relations to be necessarily embedded in (that is: 
subordinated to) society itself. The key way in which market relations are embedded in the 
modern age is through the policies of the state, which (often haphazardly) works to 
counteract the constant interest of businesses in marketing everything as commodities; 
which, if it were achieved, Polanyi (2001: 3) says would risk ‘annihilating the human and 
natural substance of society’. This perspective suggests that the state and the economic 
elites (business) cannot ever fully overpower one another – if they did, the results for capital 
accumulation and society would be disastrous. Rather, states and businesses stand in a 
complex dialectical relationship of conflict over power and co-dependency for power. In a 
Polanyian reading, state–business relations may then be seen as negotiating the political 
balance needed to reconcile economic change with the protection of the social foundations of 
the economy. 
3.4 Some conclusions from the literature 
Much more could be said about the vast literature on the relationships between the state and 
business and how they affect development. For practical reasons, we have focused this 
review narrowly on the developmental states literature and recent work that highlights some 
characteristics and effects of ‘effective’ state–business relations, as well as a snapshot of key 
theoretical perspectives on the political economy of state and business. In a broader review 
in future we may hope also to capture further insights from literatures that were beyond the 
scope here. 
What can we learn from the reviewed literatures? First, the developmental states and 
‘effective state–business relations’ literature highlights the importance of institutions for 
coordination of policy with business objectives – ‘embedded autonomy’, ‘infrastructural 
                                                
21 Ebner (2009: 385) suggests the East Asian ‘miracle’ was a case of a Schumpeterian ‘entrepreneurial state… carrying out the 
entrepreneurial function of introducing novelty’. 
22 Gramsci deals specifically at length with Fordism; developmentalism and neoliberalism came after his time. 
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power’, etc. There is a strong emphasis on coordination through formal institutions (and 
some informal ones), and formal institutions explain some growth successes. At the same 
time, the notion of the developmental state risks increasingly becoming a buzzword if 
apolitical notions of coordination or collaboration eclipse questions about power and 
interests. Several of our case studies show how formal institutions matter but are often not 
enough to explain outcomes. 
Second, state–business relations reflect or embody a balance of power between different 
interests, as many contributions highlight, be this between state and business authority 
(Weber, Lindblom), entrepreneurs and government (Schumpeter, Mazzucato), or capital and 
labour (Gramsci, Polanyi). States and businesses may be weaker or stronger, but there are 
unresolved questions around how their interests are aggregated, and which (or whose) 
interests are reflected in state–business relations. Neither the state nor business is a 
monolith (‘statolatry’, business as ‘capital’), and they themselves must be unpacked. 
Third, the diversity of existing state–business relations cautions against the idea that ‘good’ 
state–business relations can be implanted from one context to another, as does the notion of 
coherence between institutional spheres, which the VoC literature introduces. Furthermore, 
viewing development outcomes more broadly than economic growth calls into question what 
kind of state–business relations may qualify as ‘good’ at all. This lends credence to our focus 
on non-prescriptively evaluating state–business relations in this report. 
Fourth, much of the literature focuses on the structures (or institutions) of state–business 
relations, and says less about the process. As we said in Section 2, process and agency are 
important, too, for understanding how state–business relations shape developmental 
outcomes in practice. This is clearly an issue more for in-depth case studies rather than 
grand theory, and one which we seek to reflect more strongly in our case studies in Section 
4, each of which traces the processes in specific episodes of change. 
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4 Four case studies of state–business relations 
4.1 Introduction 
Four case studies underpin our exploration of state–business relations in development, and 
our synthesis of common themes and lessons (Section 5). Our full case studies appear in the 
annexes, while this section presents a summary as follows: 
 Case 1: Export-oriented growth and democratic transition in Chile 
 Case 2: Food fortification and the nutrition agenda in Tanzania 
 Case 3: The creation of a financial inclusion sector in India 
 Case 4: Private commercial farms and public land in Ethiopia 
As summarised in Table 4.1, these four cases cover a considerable breadth of state–
business relations in developing, emerging and middle-income economies, representing 
episodes of recent change. They showcase state–business relations in a range of economic 
and social development policy areas. 
Table 4.1 Characteristics of the case studies 
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4.2 Case study 1: Export-oriented growth and democratic 
transition in Chile 
This case study examines two sets of state–business relations that contributed to Chile’s 
high rate of export-oriented growth and increasing trade openness following the return to 
democracy in the 1990s. While this was a period when relations were uneasy and trust 
between the government and business was low, a mutual fear of instability – economic and 
political – opened the door to dialogue. 
In the first set of interactions, DIRECON, Chile’s government trade agency, engaged 
business, particularly the peak manufacturing association, SOFOFA, and labour, in trade 
policy fora and other processes through which they received briefings and provided advice 
on trade negotiations. While initially business and labour participated in the same processes, 
their significantly differing interests led to increasingly ineffective engagement and ultimately 
a shift to labour and business being consulted separately. The net result of these interactions 
was to create shared knowledge, preferences and technical expertise between business and 
state representatives, as well as personal relationships of trust. Labour, on the other hand, 
saw its influence wane. In the second set of interactions, CORFO, Chile’s economic 
                                                
23 Based on authors’ own assessments of the economic and political system. 
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development agency, coordinated the upgrading of groups of agro-industry firms, particularly 
small and medium enterprises (SMEs). Through these processes, CORFO supported sectors 
to reorganise production, improve standards and upgrade productive capabilities, leading to 
improved export competitiveness. At the same time, these changes saw a shift to more 
seasonal and non-unionised jobs in the countryside and a loss of landholdings for rural 
smallholders. 
Overall, the outcomes of these state–business relations in Chile include a more competitive 
and outward-looking economy, with a number of new free trade agreements signed and 
exports growing from 23 per cent of GDP in the early 1980s to 42 per cent by 2006. 
However, the marginalisation of labour – and later also environmental groups – compared to 
the close state–business relations has opened the way for measures (dispute settlement 
rules) that could weaken labour and environmental regulation. The quality of jobs and 
livelihoods in the countryside has also been negatively impacted. 
Please refer to Annex A for the full case study. 
4.3 Case study 2: Food fortification and the nutrition agenda in 
Tanzania 
This case study examines a state-led multi-stakeholder strategy, where the government in 
Tanzania sought to leverage private sector resources and skills to achieve a public policy 
goal: enhancing the nutrition of the general population. However, the interactions excluded a 
key class of actors and created an outcome that missed its mark. 
The government sought to reduce undernutrition via the establishment of the Food 
Fortification Action Plan, among other initiatives, which set regulations to require the food 
industry in Tanzania to fortify all flour (wheat and maize) and locally processed edible oil. 
From the outset, the Fortification Plan was encouraged by international aid donors 
(particularly the World Bank) and designed through a multi-stakeholder process with multiple 
ministries, international donor agencies and large-scale domestic manufacturing firms. It was 
championed by the President and aligned with high-level (national and international) political 
support for the nutrition agenda. While these negotiations managed successfully to leverage 
the organised wheat flour industry’s resources and engage larger firms to fortify their 
products, the outcomes for the population were mixed, as the diffuse maize sector, 
comprised of SMEs, is non-compliant. While improvements in micronutrient fortification of 
some staple foods was achieved, these fail to reach the urban and rural poor who consume 
maize flour produced by these small mills. 
The ‘multi-sector strategy’ had de facto excluded small-scale millers and small farmers, as 
the agenda was set by the ruling party, international agencies and large businesses. The 
idea of fortification with industrially produced nutrients was supported by international donors, 
but pushed the nutrition agenda in a direction where the interests of the state aligned with a 
few large domestic manufacturers (wheat producers), rather than with the vast majority of 
small enterprises (maize producers) who produce most of the food which reaches poor 
communities. Had small food producers been brought to the table, or had the nutrition 
agenda not been set to focus so strongly on industrial food fortification, the aim of improving 
access to nutritious food would possibly have been pursued more effectively. In this case, 
the results achieved were enhanced business reputations for larger firms in the private 
sector, increased expenditure on the government side, but little or no impact for the poor and 
the informal sector. 
Please refer to Annex B for the full case study. 
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4.4 Case study 3: The creation of a financial inclusion sector in 
India 
This case study examines the drive for financial inclusion in India, first through self-help 
groups (SHGs), then microfinance institutions (MFIs), and recently, state-driven mass 
banking programmes. SHGs are semi-formal organisations of women, assembled to 
collectively access formal banking services; they emerged in the 1980s and have been 
supported by state governments and parastatal organisations. Commercial MFIs emerged in 
the early 2000s and grew rapidly, thanks to supportive policies, deregulation, a singular 
policy focus on credit, and financial support received from commercial banks, state 
governments and investors. Since 2011, the Indian central government has launched several 
mass banking initiatives to bring about universal financial service coverage, working 
particularly through large public banks to extend accounts, insurance services, debit cards, 
and overdrafts. 
The state in India, working with and through business actors (in different constellations), has 
thus consistently since the 1980s worked to increase market-based financial access for poor 
people; a case of state activism. However, state–business relations also showed 
interdependence, with the state needing capital from the financial sector to pursue its social 
policy goals, and the financial sector in turn seeking permissive regulation, policy support 
and public sector funding. The requisite interactions were largely built on informal elite 
networks and a shared broad consensus that financial expansion and hands-off regulation 
were necessary. For many years, the Reserve Bank of India was a key broker in these 
interactions, and only recently central government has asserted more regulatory authority 
through forceful initiatives to speed up financial inclusion. The shared vision that financial 
access should bring modernity and pro-poor growth was a key factor in facilitating the 
(shape-shifting but consistent) collaborations of state and business actors. 
The results of these efforts have included a massive growth of micro-lending in India – from 
US$500m (2005) to US$5.5bn (2010) – a deeper reach by banks and other formal finance 
institutions, and tens of millions of new accounts (although many remain dormant). But also, 
a lack of evidence persists that financial access has ameliorated poverty in India, and there 
have been major episodes of social unrest and economic insecurity linked to microfinance. 
Please refer to Annex C for the full case study. 
4.5 Case study 4: Private commercial farms and public land in 
Ethiopia 
This case study explores state–business relations in a two-pronged farm commercialisation 
strategy in Ethiopia since the turn of the century: cut flowers, and large-scale food and 
biofuel crops farming. Emulating the ‘developmental state’ approach, the Ethiopian 
government exerted an active role, creating formal institutions and using these to enlist 
business; the idea of ‘developmentalism’ proving malleable enough to accommodate an 
agriculture-based (rather than industry-based) economic development programme. These 
efforts formed part of longer-term strategy to transform what was largely subsistence 
agriculture through commercialisation for national economic growth and development. 
State activism and business diplomacy were directed mainly at international businesses, and 
negotiations focused on subsidised access to state-controlled land and various tax incentives 
in exchange for business investment, technology and expertise to produce growth and 
development. Key players in the cut flower sector were the Ethiopian Horticulture Producer 
Exporters Association (EHPEA) on the business side and its public counterpart, the 
Ethiopian Horticulture Development Agency (EHDA). While large commercial farms were 
facilitated by the Agricultural Investment Land Administration Agency (AILAA), businesses 
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did not have a formal agency through which to interact with the government. Government 
and businesses negotiated agreements individually or through their representative bodies on 
land leases and investment. Moreover, indigenous communities, national and international 
non-governmental organisations, and research organisations contested the policy and its 
execution and shaped and reshaped state–business relations. 
State–business relations over commercial farming in Ethiopia produced a vibrant cut flower 
sector of more than 100 farms, which generated in excess of 50,000 jobs and US$1bn in 
export revenue. The jobs created were especially for women and in urban and peri-urban 
areas with acute employment challenges. On the other hand, many of the 400-plus large-
scale farms licenced to produce food and biofuel crops for export either did not start or 
started at a much smaller scale than planned, hence vast areas of land remained unutilised. 
In some places the farms displaced communities and rendered them landless, and have 
been accused of contributing to deforestation. 
Please refer to Annex D for the full case study. 
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5 Synthesis of the case studies 
5.1 Case overview: state–business relations at the centre 
While the cases highlight the diversity of state–business relations, this section synthesises 
the evidence to reveal common themes and draw preliminary lessons. In different ways 
these case studies overturn conventional wisdom about the business or state forces at work 
in particular areas of development. What at first sight appears to be a business-led initiative 
often turns out to be one strongly shaped by the state. In other cases, where the state is 
typically seen as leading, it may actually be following. Chile, for example, is hardly known as 
a stereotypical developmental state. If anything, given its recent economic history as a 
neoliberal poster-child, a minimalistic ‘hands-off’ state engagement with business may be 
expected. However, state–business relations in Chile were marked by a strong coordinative 
form of engagement. The case of food fortification in Tanzania is one where, in an almost 
model ‘multi-sector strategy’, the state sought to leverage private sector resources and skills 
to achieve a public policy goal. However, to the extent that the state–business relations here 
may be understood as negotiations, they excluded a key class of actors and created a 
negotiated outcome that missed its mark. At first sight, the creation of a private commercial 
agricultural export sector in Ethiopia comes with all the hallmarks of the developmental state: 
a strong government exerting active control over the development agenda, creating formal 
institutions, and using these to enlist organised business into longer-term strategies for 
national economic growth. But the case’s details expose that the developmental state can be 
as much an aspirational idea as a reality, especially where weak state–business 
relationships fail to drive investment. 
5.2 Main themes and features of the four cases 
This section draws out the main features of state–business relations as they developed in 
our four cases. We start with three cross-cutting themes. The first is a clear interdependence 
between business and state actors – the need for joint action or an exchange of resources – 
acting as a catalyst for negotiation and cooperation. However, whether the nature of the 
cooperation so achieved should be understood as collaboration or collusion remains an 
outstanding question. The second relates to the negotiation process; which in our cases 
evolved as either involving a network of actors in an ongoing policy dialogue, or a more direct 
quid pro quo exchange in response to policy priorities. The third is the reflection that not only 
power and interests shape negotiations, but also ideas and ideologies. We also present three 
insights or features of state–business relations that are reflected in a number of the cases: 
the issue of which actors were included (or excluded) from the negotiation, the role of 
international actors and multi-level governance networks, and the ongoing relevance of 
informal institutions. 
5.2.1 Interdependence as a catalyst for negotiation 
All four cases are firmly situated in the realm of negotiation at the core of Figure 2.2; mostly 
towards the top right quadrant. While the cases contain elements or aspects of the other 
quadrants, none drifted into open conflict, domination or control. None of the negotiations 
broke down completely. Nor were there clear cases of ‘capture’ or ‘control’ by one party over 
the other. In Tanzania, for example, while the government directly mandated change 
(fortification) through regulation, this policy was based on an agenda set through a multi-
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Box 5.1 The role of the state and business in China’s engagement in 
Africa 
In line with much of the literature, our four case studies analyse state–business relations 
predominately at the national level. However, state–business relations are also multi-layered. Here 
we explore how state–business relations in China influence investment in Africa; a familiar story that 
is much more complicated than is generally recognised. Certainly, the role the Chinese state and its 
‘state capitalism’ plays in Africa’s development is contentious; opinion is divided between those who 
see China’s role as rapacious, even colonial, with asymmetrical and unstable relations (Clinton 
2011; Fisher 2011), and those who see China as a developmental role model of partnership and 
mutual benefit (Renard 2011; Diaw and Lessoua 2013; Gu and Carty 2014). The reality is that 
China’s overseas investment by state-owned enterprises (SOEs) is multi-layered and complex (Gu 
and Schiere 2011; Bräutigam and Zhang 2013; Chintu and Williamson 2013). Chinese businesses 
are flexible, pragmatic, less risk-averse and with longer horizons than northern counterparts (Chintu 
and Williamson 2013); state–business relations within China are diverse and disaggregated, 
operating at provincial as well as national levels; while relations between Chinese businesses and 
African states are mostly informal and uncoordinated. 
Core actors in China’s economic development experience 
The private sector is the new driving force of the Chinese economy. The renaissance of Chinese 
manufacturing, creation of a major service sector, including financial and banking industries, an 
intensification in the operations of megalithic SOEs in the energy, mineral and agribusiness 
industries, and the emergence of business associations are key features. State–business relations 
within China work through patterns of informal or indirect influence, for example through the opening 
up of party membership to successful private business leaders. Notable too, is the growing 
importance of Chambers of Commerce in policy advocacy, fulfilling party-state needs for liaison with 
private business, and acting as important intermediaries for promoting trade and, latterly, China’s 
policy of encouraging enterprises to ‘go out’ to overseas markets. 
Role of the Chinese state towards Chinese business in Africa 
The Chinese state’s role vis-à-vis business in Africa is substantial; but is contextual rather than 
directive. Change is driven by actual business practices, within the context of overall strategic state 
control. The government’s policy framework provides the context, authority and legitimacy for 
Chinese firms to go to Africa, based on the ‘Africa Policy’ and the ‘Going-global’ policy. A key 
challenge, however, is a perceived gap between state policy formulation and implementation; that 
is, between the publicly stated national goals of China and the African states, and the actual 
competitive realities of business practices facing Chinese firms in Africa (Gu 2009, 2011; Bräutigam 
and Zhang 2013). While the Chinese state has a strong, dedicated, interlocking institutional network 
of agencies at home to support firms ‘going out’ to Africa, the principal sources of information are 
frequently friends, networking introductions and businesses’ own research and trading experiences. 
These are only then followed by central government, embassies and local Chinese community 
networks in Africa, and finally Chinese local government or other local firms (Gu and Carty 2014; Gu 
et al. 2016). 
Conclusion 
There is a pressing need to better understand China’s engagement in Africa, shifting the focus 
beyond the central state. Chinese firms (state-owned and private) play a key role; operating 
principally to their own commercial priorities; notwithstanding government and party ownerships, 
policies and strictures. Processes are informal, unplanned, negotiated, decentralised, uncoordinated 
and diversified. All embed ‘the state’, but in different ways and to varying degrees, adding to the 





Our cases demonstrate an interdependence between business and state actors, leading 
them to negotiate common solutions or to exchange resources (financial resources, as well 
as information, skills, expertise and support), based on a degree of balanced – though not 
equal – power and shared objectives. In Chile, for example, CORFO wanted to change the 
behaviour of small agro-processing businesses in order to achieve growth objectives, while 
business sought resources and state support to invest in upgrading. In India, the state 
needed capital to pursue social policy goals, and enabled (variously) microfinance and mass 
banking initiatives, while bringing the poor to the financial market, initially through self-help 
groups. In Ethiopia, the government aimed at attracting capital, technology and expertise, as 
well as creating jobs, expanding food production and reducing poverty, while business 
sought land and a supportive policy environment. 
If most of the cases sit towards the bottom left corner of the matrix, are these negotiated 
settlements best described as ‘collaboration’ or ‘collusion’? Both terms suggest cooperation 
between actors for mutual benefit; however, in collusion this benefit comes at the detriment 
of other actors, who do not have the same opportunities to participate or otherwise secure 
outcomes in their favour. Collaboration and collusion are therefore distinguished by the 
process (who has the opportunities to participate or have their interests represented?) and 
the outcome (who is affected, who benefits?). 
Process conditions to address participation and representation suggested by our review of 
the literature include mechanisms that enable transparency, accountability of negotiators to 
their constituency, effective competition policy and the presence of a Weberian bureaucracy 
insulated from particular interests. Yet defining non-collusive interactions based on these 
factors sets an unrealistically high bar that (for many reasons) is unlikely to be met in many 
developing countries, and cannot easily be manufactured. To quote Rodrik (2013: 31), only 
slightly out of context, such prescriptions would essentially suggest, ‘if you want to become 
rich, you need to look like rich countries’. Rodrik’s prescription for growth advocates instead 
heterodox ‘second-best’ strategies. More analysis is needed of the types of second-best 
strategies that work in different contexts to foster collaborative rather than collusive state–
business relations. The second factor that distinguishes collusion from collaboration is 
outcomes, and who benefits from state–business relations. We come back to outcomes in 
the next section. 
5.2.2 Negotiation processes 
We identify two broad types of (sometimes overlapping) processes at play in the four cases 
of state–business relations: 
Integrative or networked negotiation: Some of the cases reflect Haggard et al.’s (1997) 
category of ‘business and government as a network’. Through repeat interactions, these 
networks of business and state actors coordinate; share information and technical expertise; 
develop collective learning and consensus about preferences; and negotiate shared policy 
proposals over time. In Chile’s trade policy network, for example, although relationships 
started on shaky ground, they were consolidated through the process of trade negotiations. 
In India, the push for financial inclusion involved elite actors with a common vision of a 
modern and broad-based financial sector, although based on different underlying interests. 
The state saw more equitable financial access as a palliative for social inequality, while 
business interests focused on acquiring new clients. The importance of networked policy 
dialogue and agenda setting suggests paying closer attention to ‘who knows whom’, and 
where and how they interact, in studying state–business relations. But the notion of 
networked interaction should not distract from issues of relative power. Box 5.1 points to 
information flow and collaboration as part of a competition for dominance as ‘networked 
hierarchy’ (Lin and Milhaupt 2013) which in China means that success in business leads to 
rewards in the political realm and vice versa. 
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Policy-directed concession-exchange: While some of the cases reflect networked 
relations between business and state, in others, coordination is achieved through a focused 
concession-exchange negotiation of resources. In the case of cut flower farming in Ethiopia, 
government and business negotiated an agreement through their representative bodies on 
land leases and investment. The government aimed at attracting capital, technology and 
expertise, in support of transforming agriculture through commercialisation. The cut flower 
sector successfully pressed for a five-year sector strategy, access to land and credit, and 
coordination of transportation for export. In Chile, CORFO catalysed a process to work with 
businesses to improve quality and competitiveness, and used special instruments (PROFOs) 
to incentivise business cooperation within a geographically based association. The risks here 
are principal-agent problems where the desired outcome (for example, investment) that 
represents the goal driving the negotiation is not achieved. The incidences of land 
speculation in Ethiopia are a case in point. These processes reveal that much of ‘how 
business does business, and where it does business’ – to paraphrase Helen Clark’s 
quotation from page 1 – is shaped also by negotiations with the state over the 
implementation of policy. 
5.2.3 Ideas matter 
Several of the cases suggest that understanding state–business interactions based only on 
power, interests and processes misses part of the story. Ideas and ideologies also matter. In 
India, the state’s focus on financial inclusion was partly a reflection of elite actors’ ideas of 
modernity and social inclusion. In Ethiopia, the idea of developmentalism and emulating 
successful ‘developmental states’ shaped state–business relations. This vision and narrative 
fit with Ethiopia’s strong state, and proved malleable enough to accommodate an agriculture-
based (rather than industry-based) economic development programme. 
Although ideas alone cannot explain or create functional state–business relations, we would 
suggest that they have very powerful effects in being able to move relations along the vertical 
axis in the matrix (Figure 2.2). A positive example: the case of Chile illustrates how what, 
structurally, should have been a relationship of conflict (given the fairly equal power but 
divergent interests between the nascent democratic regime and the country’s conservative 
business elites) instead led to stable negotiations. Given the country’s recent history, the 
idea of maintaining economic and therefore political stability above all else was important, as 
were smaller, more practical ideas, such as the ‘room next door’ institution which kept 
business representatives connected to policy discussions. Over time, through the emergence 
of trust and a shared interest in competitiveness, state–business relations in Chile moved 
gradually closer to true collaboration. The case of Tanzania, meanwhile, suggests the idea 
that fortification with industrially produced nutrients, which was supported by international 
donors, pushed negotiations in a direction where the interests of the state aligned with large 
domestic manufacturers, rather than the majority of small enterprises that produce the food 
that reaches poor communities. 
5.2.4 Other features: international actors, informal institutions, engaging 
the right actors 
There are three other striking insights that cut across more than one case and provide 
pointers for further research and analysis of state–business relations: 
 In countries that were unable to mobilise sufficient domestic resources, notably 
Ethiopia and Tanzania, international actors and multi-level governance networks 
affect domestic state–business relations. In Tanzania, where approximately one-third 
of government spending was financed by donor funds, international donors were a 
key actor; while in Ethiopia, the government brought international and diaspora 
investors to the table through diplomatic missions in major capital cities. This is also a 
key message from Box 5.1, in which ‘going global’ by Chinese agri-business has 
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been shaped by national and provincial authorities in China. Understanding state–
business relations means also analysing the impact of international actors including 
donors, diasporas, international advisers and NGOs. State–business relations, if they 
ever were, are no longer just domestic affairs. 
 It is obvious, yet important, to point out that successful outcomes of state–business 
relations require engaging the right actors for given policy objectives. The Tanzania 
case, for example, raises the question of why the negotiation focused on large 
businesses involved in wheat fortification, when it should have been apparent that 
these businesses were not involved in the markets of the poorest. Clearly, 
negotiations with large companies within a concentrated sector is less costly and 
complex than attempting to engage a very diffuse sector of micro- and small-scale 
millers. Yet working with the actors that have the right tools for the challenge is 
paramount. While much of the literature emphasises business associations as key 
contributors to effective state–business relations, associations can also be rent-
seeking, and doubts have arisen as to whether the role of associations is overstated. 
The question for research is how state–business relations should be understood and 
analysed in relation to small firms that nevertheless hold the key to policy objectives. 
 An analysis of informal institutions is needed. Earlier studies of state–business 
relations have acknowledged the importance of informal institutions. These include 
not only extra- formal networks, but also shared cultural-cognitive and normative 
frames, which relates to the power of ideas (above). However, despite acknowledging 
the relevance of the informal, methodological challenges have meant that quantitative 
studies tend to focus only on formal institutions. Case study approaches, while better 
at taking into account informal institutions, see these mostly as stepping stones to 
more formal structures. Our cases suggest that informal institutions continue to be 
important and more pervasive than has generally been recognised. For example, the 
Chile case shows how repeated formal interactions can generate informal and 
personalised relationships of trust, loyalty and friendship, which matter even when 
they are embedded in formal structures. 
5.3 Development outcomes 
The aim of our work is not simply to analyse state–business relations in developing 
countries, but to build understanding of how these relations impact development. While the 
literature highlights that repeated interactions between business and the state can lead to 
trust and cooperation, cooperation is no guarantee that good policy and development will 
result. While some existing studies also correlate interactions with development outcomes, 
these focus overwhelmingly on economic development and aspects such as investment, 
trade and growth. We, too, look at these elements. However, growth is not enough for 
development if the benefits are severely unequal or are achieved at the expense of actors 
who lack the opportunity to secure outcomes in their favour. Such state–business relations 
may be better understood as collusive than collaborative. 
There are different ways in which broader development outcomes could be assessed, in 
terms of food security or job creation, for example, or in relation to the SDGs – areas that we 
see as fruitful for future investigation. However, we have chosen to frame our current 
analysis in terms of three ‘defining challenges and transformations’ articulated by the Institute 
of Development Studies as being at the heart of the present agenda of global development24 
(IDS 2015). These are: to reduce inequalities, to accelerate sustainability, and to build more 
inclusive and secure societies (as explained in Box 5.2). They encompass different 
dimensions of development – including social, economic, environmental and political – 
                                                
24 Global development highlights the universality of these challenges and transformations; not only are they challenges which 
require contributory action from actors around the world, but also the relevant transformations need to be achieved in all 
countries, not merely those usually identified as ‘developing’. 
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instead of reducing development to any singular outcome. Considering these transformations 
supports an analysis of state–business relations that deals with more than the economic 
implications of business. Their qualitative, broad, interpretive nature opens the space to 
consider outcomes beyond what the current numerical case data would support, since many 
of these outcomes are still emergent and uncertain, rather than fully demonstrated, at this 
stage. 
 
Box 5.2 Development outcomes defined 
Economic development. Economic development is often simplistically understood as growth of 
output. More broadly, it refers to a structural change in a country’s economy, connected to 
technological and social progress, sectoral upgrading and productivity growth, often measured in 
terms of economic growth and an increase in average material wellbeing (World Bank 2004). 
Reducing inequalities. Inequality has risen markedly in recent decades globally. Recognition is 
growing that action is needed, particularly by the state, to avoid the harms of inequality. Inequalities 
are associated with lower wellbeing for the vast majority, vulnerability to shocks, unequal voice and 
power, and violence and conflict (IDS 2015: 8). Reducing inequalities means not just reducing 
economic disparities themselves, but also countering the civic/political and social inequalities which 
are produced by, and in turn reproduce, economic ones (Justino and Moore 2015). 
Accelerating sustainability. Recent social and economic advances have come at increasing cost to 
the environment and climate, from the local to the global level. Accelerating sustainability amounts 
to reducing those costs and ideally reversing the trend. Technological, social and economic 
solutions for the transition to a sustainable use of resources are sought by different actors in the 
public, private and civic sectors (IDS 2015: 9). 
Building more inclusive and secure societies. Inclusion is related to inequalities, but here the focus 
is more on access to and participation in economic and political spaces and processes. Security 
refers not only to averting conflict and violence, but also to protection from threats and 
environmental, economic, political and social shocks (IDS 2015: 10). State–business relations can 
shape inclusion and security directly, where they are addressed to relevant issues, but indirectly in 




In Table 5.2 we explore the available information on the development impacts of state–
business relations in our case studies. We can, in some areas, link state–business relations 
directly to outcomes. In Tanzania, for instance, the process of state–business negotiation 
was directly linked to improvements in micronutrient fortification of staple foods; however 
these failed to reach the urban and rural poor. Had different actors been involved, by bringing 
small food producers to the table, or had the nutrition agenda not been set to focus so 
strongly on food fortification, the aim of improving access to nutritious food would have been 
pursued differently, and possibly more effectively. In Chile, the process of state–business 
negotiation between CORFO and associations of SMEs improved coordination in the sector, 
contributing to export competitiveness and significant export growth, and the creation of rural 
jobs in the process. However, these were non-unionised seasonal jobs, which arguably leave 
workers in a precarious situation; vulnerable, for example, to volatility in the external market. 
In other areas, it is difficult to attribute outcomes to the processes observed, such as 
environmental outcomes in Tanzania and India. This area warrants further exploration. 
The picture that emerges from Table 5.2 is twofold. In the economic domain that has been 
the traditional focus of analysis for work on state–business relations, our findings point to the 
positive outcomes that state–business relations can help to achieve. Our two cases in this 
area (Chile and Ethiopia) both demonstrated economic development resulting at least in part 
from an ongoing negotiation between the state and business. However, viewed with our 
somewhat wider lens, the trade-offs become apparent. These include casualisation of labour 
(Chile), exclusion of small-scale farmers (Chile and Ethiopia), and land conflicts (Ethiopia). 
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Negative environmental impacts are another outcome, although these are disputed in the 
case of Ethiopia. At one level, these trade-offs are unsurprising or not particularly unique to 
cases where state–business relations strongly matter. Changes generally create winners and 
losers. However, to judge the impact of state–business relations, we need to understand the 
degree to which those not involved in the negotiation reap benefits or suffer losses. 
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On the other hand, in the cases where social policy was the target, notably nutrition and 
financial inclusion, the picture is more mixed or negative. The elite bargain in Tanzania did 
not improve nutritional outcomes for the poorest, despite that ostensibly having been the 
policy goal. In India, the goal of financial inclusion was achieved in large measure; however, 
many bank accounts remain unused, and impact studies have failed to confirm that this 
inclusion has led to poverty reduction. These findings seem to confirm suspicions that state–
business relations in the social sphere may benefit business more than society. However, at 
this stage, we must be cautious about drawing this conclusion. 
We do not claim that the outcomes identified in these four cases are representative of the 
nature of state–business relations more generally, and we acknowledge that information 
gaps in the context of this secondary case analysis mean that we have not been able to 
explore outcomes in sufficient detail. But we do believe that our analysis makes a clear case 
for the need to understand how different structures and processes of state–business 
relations, particularly in the context of non-Weberian bureaucracies and imperfect 
institutions, impact development. 
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6 Conclusion and research agenda on state–
business negotiations 
The interplay between states and businesses profoundly affects development outcomes, 
including and going beyond growth. We suggest that many of the important interactions 
between states and businesses consist of what we refer to as ‘negotiation’; our four case 
studies focus on such interactions, which do not fit easily into any of the standard ‘boxes’ of 
conflict, collaboration, capture or co-optation. We look at Chile’s transition to democracy and 
export-oriented growth, combating malnutrition in Tanzania, creating financial inclusion in 
India and agricultural commercialisation in Ethiopia. As we see from the cases, there is often 
a marked interdependence between state and business actors that is the catalyst for 
negotiation; but to the extent that states and business do engage one another constructively, 
it is hard to say where collaboration ends or collusion begins. We identify two recurring 
patterns of negotiation processes in our cases, namely networked negotiation and policy-
directed concession-exchange. The analysis also showcases the power of ideas and 
ideologies at shaping and reshaping state–business relations over time. 
6.1 Towards a research agenda 
The question of how states and businesses interact and the implications for society is a 
recurrent theme in political, economic and sociological thought. Recent literature on state–
business relations has clearly posited ‘effective’ state–business relations as key contributors 
to economic growth and structural change. Moreover, it has suggested institutions that 
support policy coordination are important ingredients of effectiveness. However, this 
literature raises as many questions as it answers. It remains unclear whether ‘good’ 
coordinating institutions can really be transplanted from one context to another; how states’ 
and businesses’ interests are best aggregated; how formal institutions interact with informal 
ones; and finally, but crucially, how state–business relations impact broader development 
outcomes beyond economic growth. 
Further study of state–business relations within the realm of negotiation can help to 
illuminate key issues. To begin with, business and state actors are not homogenous, each 
representing a diffuse collection of actors; which necessitates recognising a diversity of 
power and interests, and how they can be aggregated and expressed. Different businesses 
will share some interests, but will also be in competition or conflict in other areas, and 
similarly, different government ministries may have shared or competing interests. The 
characteristics and strategies of negotiators (statesmen, business leaders, key bodies within 
organisations) are also determining factors. While actors act in what they understand to be 
their self-interest, which determines the degree of alignment or divergence of objectives that 
must be negotiated, we aim for a more dynamic analysis of interests that recognises how 
they are shaped by ideas and influenced by the negotiation process itself. Meanwhile, 
understanding power in state–business relations means exploring both ‘power over’ and 
‘power with’ others as actors strive towards their goals. The power used may be 
instrumental, derived from the resources which actors possess, as well as the skill with which 
they use them. But it also importantly includes the more hidden, agenda-setting or structural 
power which frames the boundaries of the negotiable and determines what is on or off the 
table in the pursuit of development. 
Vast challenges to understanding state–business relations remain, particularly in light of the 
vision embedded in the SDGs that states and businesses will work together for development. 
Building on the work above, we would suggest three complementary ways forward to be: 
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1. Developing clearer models of state–business relations in different institutional 
environments. Our case analysis identified different processes of formal and 
informal state–business relations; some more networked and others more directive, 
with a variety of state, business, labour and civil society actors involved. What are the 
different types of state–business relations, how do they work, how can we explain 
their emergence and their implications for different development outcomes? The 
literature review discussed different approaches to typologising institutional 
arrangements in different countries, such as types of developmental state, or 
Varieties of Capitalism. Ongoing research is developing these further, while asking 
critical questions about how (and how well) these typologies may work (for example, 
Schneider 2009; Routley 2012; Witt and Redding 2013). We seek to build on this 
emerging analysis to develop better comparative frameworks for understanding the 
processes and structural factors that constitute state–business relations. This work 
should be tailored specifically to developing countries, and focus on the relational 
element rather than focusing on either the state or business as the driving force. A 
further challenge – and opportunity – moreover lies in accounting for the transnational 
dimension (Unsworth 2010; Jenkins 2013), which often plays a greater role in the 
state–business relations of developing countries given the influence of international 
business and international donors. 
2. Identifying key factors that shape state–business relations and their 
development outcomes. Closely connected to an effort at developing models (or 
typologies) is the question of which variables, components or elements of state–
business relations matter most. Our research has pointed to a number of factors that 
shape state–business relations, including the actors, power and interests; it also 
suggests additional intervening variables, including institutions, linkages between 
states or businesses and international actors, policy leadership and the role of policy 
networks, and ideas and ideologies. This work may be deepened and connected to 
recent variable-based research on developmental states, industrial policy and 
economic growth (for example, Lemma and Te Velde 2015; Sen 2015), while 
broadening the perspective to include outcomes beyond growth. 
3. Explaining developmental effectiveness of state–business relations. What 
makes state–business relations ‘effective’ for development? Most current literature 
focuses on economic performance, identifying formal institutions such as investment 
promotion agencies and business associations, and proposing a ‘theory of change’ in 
which these features contribute to intermediate outcomes for economic growth such 
as information sharing, the building of trust and credibility, and fostering collective 
action to remove obstacles to investment. However, one important question is what 
are the features that contribute to state–business relations that are effective in 
achieving broader development outcomes, and based on what theory of change? Are 
these features different in different institutional contexts? Specifically, one might focus 
on the developmental outcomes encapsulated in the SDGs, or in relation to broader 
challenges such as inequality, sustainability, inclusion and security, as we have 
suggested in this paper. This would help to illuminate more clearly also any trade-
offs, contradictions and complexities between pursuing different development goals 
(for example, Schmidt et al. 2015; Waage et al. 2015). 
The challenge of developing adequate frameworks for understanding evolving state–
business relations in development is large; but given renewed calls for states and businesses 
to work together for development, the issues identified here should expectably have a central 
place on the research agenda. Tackling these questions will entail engaging in partnerships 
that go beyond the usual disciplinary boundaries. Thus far, it has often been economics that 
has studied state–business relations, but political economy, sociology, anthropology and 
others can offer vital and unexpected insights. This will especially be the case wherever the 
aim is to cast a wider view onto developmental outcomes and the role that state–business 
relations play in driving them. 
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Annex A – Case study: Export-oriented growth 
and democratic transition in Chile 
This case study examines the state–business relations that have shaped core features of 
Chile’s economy during the country’s return to democracy in the 1990s. While Chile is 
characterised by a strong, disciplined and stable party system and a diverse array of interest 
groups, the (big) business–government relationship has been closer and more extensive 
than the government’s relationship with other interest groups. For much of the country’s 
history, business leaders had moved in and out of top government jobs, including cabinet 
posts. While these relations were disrupted by President Allende’s socialist government 
(1970–73), and the military coup and economic restructuring initiated by General Pinochet 
(1973–90), as early as 1982 business was again working closely with government on 
economic policymaking. Although the practice of appointing business leaders to government 
positions ended after the return to democracy in 1990, an ongoing negotiation between 
government and industry continues to be at the heart of economic policymaking. This 
closeness has not necessarily implied malfeasance. Despite a recent series of corruption 
scandals related to corporate financing for political parties, overall the country has long been 
characterised by low levels of corruption.25 However, policymaking is inevitably most 
influenced by the perspectives and priorities of those who have the greatest access to it. 
The result of Chile’s economic policymaking since 1980 has been to create an outward-
looking economy based on copper and other mineral resources, fishing and fish processing, 
foodstuffs, iron and steel, wood and wood products, transport equipment, cement and 
textiles. After recovering from extreme crisis in 1982 when it fell more than 13 per cent, 
Chile’s GDP recovered, growing at an average of 6.4 per cent per year during the 1990s. 
Exports rose from 23 per cent of GDP in 1980 to 30 per cent of GDP by the end of the 1990s 
and 42 per cent of GDP by 2006.26 Sixty-six per cent of exports were carried out through 
preferential trade agreements with the USA, the European Free Trade Association and 
several Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) countries. By the end of 2006, Chile had 
signed trade agreements with more than 50 countries, which represent 83 per cent of global 
trade (Ferraro and Stumpo 2010). 
Despite this ‘economic miracle’, there are losers from the economic policies of recent 
decades, notably import-competing industries and rural smallholders (Kurtz 2001). While 
agro-industry created jobs in the countryside, these were seasonal and not unionised. Since 
1990, redistribution has countered the worst effects, with poverty falling from 40 per cent in 
1990 to 15 per cent in 2010. However, Chile is also one of the most unequal countries in the 
world. While inequality has also fallen – from a Gini coefficient of 57.3 in 1990 to 50.5 in 2013 
– the middle class remains small and inequality stubbornly high. 
Core actors 
Business 
Chile has a highly concentrated business sector, with a number of large conglomerates with 
diversified holdings either internationally (concentrated in core sectors) or domestically (by 
acquiring firms in different sectors). At the other end of the scale, in 2004 18.2 per cent of 
companies were SMEs. Business is represented by strong and longstanding industry bodies 
including the peak association, the Confederation of Production and Commerce (CPC), 
                                                
25 Chile ranks 23rd out of 168 countries on the Transparency International Corruptions Perception Index, for example 
www.transparency.org/country/#CHL 
26 Based on World Bank data. 
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established in 1934. The CPC includes six powerful sector peak organisations, including the 
National Agricultural Association (SNA) and the Society for Manufacturing Promotion 
(SOFOFA). The National Confederation for Medium, Small and Micro Industry, Service and 
Craftsmen of Chile (CONUPIA) represents SMEs nationally. 
Figure A1 Exports as a percentage of GDP in Chile 1980–2006 
 
Source: Authors’ own, based on World Bank Indicators. 
Figure A2 Gini index for Chile 
 
Source: Authors’ own, based on World Bank Indicators. 
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SOFOFA represents industrial interests in Chile. With 2,500 corporate affiliates, 36 sector 
association affiliates, and eight regional affiliates, SOFOFA members control more than      
80 per cent of Chile’s industrial capital and account for 30 per cent of GDP.27 In the 1990s, a 
number of export-oriented producer associations were created and included in SOFOFA, 
representing food manufacturers (Chilealimentos), fruit exporters (ASOEX) and fishing 
(SONAPESCA). These developments increased SOFOFA’s power base in agriculture 
relative to the SNA (Bull 2008). 
State 
Since Chile’s democratic transition in 1990, the country has predominately been governed by 
the Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia (Concertación), a coalition of centre-left 
parties initially formed to campaign for the return to democracy. This case study is concerned 
primarily with the first three Concertación administrations of Patricio Aylwin (Christian 
Democrat 1990–94), Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle (Christian Democrat 1994–2000) and Ricardo 
Lagos (Socialist 2000–06). Aylwin and Frei in particular won very strong mandates to govern, 
and were focused on maintaining the stability of the democratic transition. In addition, two 
state agencies, CORFO and DIRECON, are particularly relevant to the case studies. 
The Production Development Corporation of Chile (CORFO) was created in 1939 as an 
autonomous agency to support the country’s economic development by improving the 
technological capacity of (particularly) agriculture, fisheries and forestry. The agency selects 
its own technical personnel on the basis of merit, and is governed by a board headed by the 
Ministry of the Economy and composed of representatives of the private sector and relevant 
government ministries. It does not have significant resources of its own, but works closely 
with external partners: intermediary agents, financial institutions, investment funds, 
universities and technology centres, collaborations which enhance the agency’s knowledge 
and expertise (Nelson 2007; Ferraro and Stumpo 2010; Rivas 2012). 
The General Directorate of International Economic Relations (DIRECON) was set up in 1979, 
and is part of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It is seen as a highly competent and relatively 
powerful agency in the area of trade and foreign economic policymaking, and as a 
counterweight to the powerful Central Bank and the Economy Ministry (Faust 2004). 
DIRECON officials form a key part of Chile’s trade negotiating team, and lead the 
engagement with business over trade policy development. 
Other 
Chile’s democracy is traditionally corporatist, giving the peak labour association (as well as 
business) a formal role in policymaking. While organised labour was significantly weakened 
under the Pinochet dictatorship, the return to democracy saw labour, represented by the 
Unitary Confederation of Labour (CUT), restored to this formal role in policy negotiations. 
State–business relations and Chile’s export orientation 
Upon Chile’s return to democracy in 1990, there were substantial fears that the country could 
slip back into the economic crisis and inflationary shocks of earlier decades. Therefore, the 
majority of the elite, regardless of ideology, supported maintaining the key features of 
Pinochet’s pro-market reforms including macroeconomic stability, export-orientation, and a 
business-friendly investment climate. Patricio Aylwin’s campaign explicitly committed to 
continuation of these reforms (Armijo and Fauber 2002). The commitment to this economic 
model was important to the developing relations between the Aylwin regime and the 
business sector. At first these relations were uneasy; business had been (and some still 
were) strong supporters of the dictatorship. However, business scepticism was overcome, 
                                                
27 www.sofofa.cl/english/sofofa2004.htm#3 
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due in part to pre-existing social contacts between business leaders and representatives of 
the Christian Democrats (Bull 2008), and in part to the government’s commitment to 
maintaining the economic model that business favoured. A mutual fear of instability – 
economic or political – opened the door to dialogue, despite mistrust between the parties. 
The core features of Chile’s economy shaped by state–business relations include: 
 high levels of growth in non-traditional exports, driven by government support for 
coordination and upgrading in these sectors; 
 the rapid negotiation of more than 50 free trade agreements. 
Growth in non-traditional exports 
Pinochet’s reforms had liberalised trade and created the potential for export expansion. 
However, not all sectors had the capacity to export. Prior to 1980, Chile’s agro-industry, 
which later became a major exporter, was dominated by domestic firms using small-scale, 
second-hand equipment and discard-quality raw materials. Under the Aylwin and Frei 
administrations, export success was heavily supported by state intervention led by CORFO, 
which assumed a new role in promoting the reorganisation of these firms. These efforts built 
on similar programmes first implemented under the Pinochet regime.28 
Among CORFO’s policy instruments was the ‘Development Project’, known as a PROFO,29 
initiated in 1993. It sought to identify new ways to organise production, improve standards 
and upgrade productive capabilities in order to improve competitiveness, especially of SMEs. 
The goal was to move away from competitiveness based on low wages, and towards 
competitiveness based on productive capabilities (Perez-Aleman 2000). Support was given 
to groups of companies or associations. These newly created associations consisted of 
generally 8 to 15 firms in the same sector and vicinity, producing similar or complementary 
products. They were expected to develop a collective business strategy and a new, more 
skilled and competitive business association. CORFO provided finance and a group manager 
to support associations to develop and implement a joint plan. By 1997, there were 306 
PROFOs in Chile, with 3,400 SMEs involved (Perez-Aleman 2000; Ferraro and Stumpo 
2010). 
The nature of the collaboration between CORFO and these new associations of SMEs 
stands in contrast to the traditional role of industry associations, oriented towards defending 
the particular interests of segments of the business community. CORFO facilitated the new 
associations in order to reorient the sector towards export through better coordination, 
diffusion of knowledge and promotion of collective learning (Perez-Aleman 2000). Working 
through small associations with a broad membership also made it less likely for CORFO to 
be captured by any one individual or group (Nelson 2007). In this way, CORFO managed to 
catalyse a process to identify how best to improve the quality and competitiveness of Chile’s 
exports (Perez-Aleman 2000). Effectively, this state–business relation functioned to 
overcome a collective action problem, in that individual SMEs were unlikely to achieve 
competitiveness through their own investment – the whole sector needed to change. This 
does not imply that CORFO had superior knowledge of what best to do in order to achieve 
upgrading, however. Rather CORFO catalysed a process with business to identify how best 
to improve the quality and competitiveness of Chile’s exports (Perez‐Aleman 2000). 
                                                
28 In 1975, the Pinochet government created PROCHILE, an agency to support alliances of agro-industrial firms and assist them 
in entering export markets. 
29 PROFOs built on policies that had already been implemented by PROCHILE (the Export Promotion Bureau of Chile) under 
the Pinochet government. 
44 
Free trade agreements 
As Chile transitioned back to democracy, numerous bodies were set up to bring business 
and labour into trade policymaking under DIRECON. Labour was represented by the CUT, 
while SOFOFA played a strong role in coordinating and representing business interests. 
SOFOFA’s role was bolstered as they hired a former director of DIRECON with long 
experience in trade negotiations, as well as an expert on the WTO, also from DIRECON. 
These appointments established SOFOFA’s trade expertise and created important links with 
the ministry leading trade negotiations. Formal bodies were established involving business 
and (in some cases) labour in trade policy, including the Bilateral Council for Trade and 
Investment and the tripartite Forum for Productive Development (FDP), both focused on 
issues of competitiveness and trade. Business and labour were also invited to participate in 
trade negotiations through the institution of the ‘room next door’, in which business and 
labour representatives literally followed the negotiations in a room beside the main 
proceedings, receiving briefings and providing advice (Bull 2008). 
However, due to significantly different interests that were hard to reconcile, it became 
ineffective to try to bring business and labour together in one single grouping. The FDP was 
closed down, for example, and its functions replaced by the Public-Private Council for Export 
Development (CPPDE), which was closely tied to SOFOFA and excluded labour 
representation. Similarly, the ‘room next door’ process broke down as labour was torn 
between a desire to exert influence and a total rejection of free trade. Business and labour 
ended up in different ‘rooms next door’ to avoid the conflicting interests holding up 
negotiations. While engagement continued, each group was consulted separately (Bull 
2008). 
As a result of these processes, a close network and a high degree of consensus in terms of 
trade policy priorities developed between public officials, led by DIRECON, and business, led 
by SOFOFA. This created predictability, facilitated effective negotiations and helped secure 
support for trade agreements at home. This trade policy network emerged through repeated 
interactions between business and the state, in bodies such as the CPPDE and in the series 
of intensive negotiations that Chile carried out with big trading blocs like the USA, Europe, 
Mercosur and Asia. Over time, these relations created a shared knowledge and technical 
expertise, as well as a general consensus about preferences, priorities and benefits of free 
trade policies. They also created personal relationships of trust, and even loyalty and 
friendship, that were embedded in these formal institutions (Bull 2008). 
While not all business was united in supporting Chile’s approach to trade liberalisation,30 the 
business sector is by far the most active and influential non-state actor in Chile’s trade 
negotiations (Herreros 2010). Although both the Aylwin and Frei administrations aimed to re-
establish labour participation in policy deliberations, labour was effectively excluded from the 
close state–business network that emerged. A similar picture arises in relation to the 
environment. Chile’s growth in export industries have resulted in significant levels of pollution 
and environmental damage, including water and air pollution from mining and pulp and paper 
production, and the depletion of fish stocks. While Chile’s economic opening came at a time 
when no environmental management policies were in place and the environmental 
movement was not strong, more recently, environmental groups in Chile have protested new 
trade negotiations on the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). They particularly highlight how the 
TPP would open the way for measures (dispute settlement rules) that would allow investors 
to sue governments and demand compensation if regulations, on the environment or labour, 
for example, are enacted that are deemed to violate free trade and damage their profitability 
(Fortin 2014, 2015). While government engagement with civil society on such issues has 
                                                
30 The SNA had taken a protectionist stance in early trade negotiations, and during the negotiations with MERCOSUR even 
chose to stay out of the negotiations completely and to protest outside. However, eventually the SNA’s anti-free trade position 
weakened (Bull 2008). 
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increased in recent years, these tend to be limited to bilateral consultations and briefings by 
government officials and are unlikely to have the same influence as the close policy network 
between business and the state. 
Conclusions – implications 
This case study highlights the role of certain types of state–business relations in contributing 
to Chile’s successful development of export-oriented trade in non-traditional sectors. Overall, 
these relations were based on a productive interaction between business and the state, 
rather than one characterised by rent-seeking. They supported the country to maintain 
political and economic stability, upgrade agribusiness and grow non-traditional exports in this 
sector, and to negotiate trade agreements with more than 50 countries. At the same time, 
and particularly in relation to Chile’s trade policy network, the boundaries between public and 
private functions were blurred while social sectors were marginalised. The net result of 
strong state–business relations has therefore been to build a more competitive and outward-
looking economy, but to weaken efforts to build more inclusive policymaking, opening the 
way for measures that threaten to undermine environmental and labour regulation. 
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Annex B – Case study: Food fortification and 
the nutrition agenda in Tanzania 
Tanzania has a population of around 50 million people. Its economy has enjoyed a real gross 
domestic product (GDP) strong and steady growth rate average of 7 per cent in the last ten 
years. The main drivers of growth recently have been several fast-growing sectors, such as 
construction, transport and financial services (World Bank 2016). Agriculture remains a key 
sector of Tanzania’s economy, as it accounts for 45 per cent of GDP and is the source of 
livelihood for more than three quarters of the population. However, Tanzania’s agriculture 
remains small-scale, undercapitalised and labour-intensive (Cooksey 2012). Tanzania’s 
political system has been democratic with multi-party elections since 1995. Political decision-
making is highly centralised but complicated by vested interests among cliques within the 
ruling party. This allows little room for the inclusion of views from outside high-ranking 
political circles (Anyimadu 2016). In addition, Tanzania is one of the largest recipients of 
international aid in sub-Saharan Africa. From 2007 to 2011, approximately one third of 
government spending was financed by donor funds (Anyimadu 2016). 
Despite this steady economic growth, Tanzania still faces a major undernutrition problem, 
with one of the world’s highest rates of chronic undernutrition in children – 42 per cent of 
children under five are stunted and 30 per cent of women are deficient in iron (NBS and ICF 
Macro 2011). Regardless, evidence shows that economic growth is not sufficient to reduce 
undernutrition (Bhutta et al. 2008; Headey 2012). The problem is particularly acute among 
people living in rural areas and lower income groups. In the last ten years, with high-level 
support from the Tanzanian central government, nutrition has become a national policy 
priority. The Government of Tanzania established the National Nutrition Strategy (NNS) 
(2009–2015), with a core element being the Food Fortification Action Plan, initiated by the 
National Food Fortification Alliance (see below) to increase the supply of foods rich in 
micronutrients in the country (Ministry of Health and Social Welfare 2011). In addition, from 
the outset, the Prime Minister’s Office of Tanzania provided support for the nutrition agenda. 
Tanzania’s push to reduce undernutrition was aligned with a strong international commitment 
to tackle malnutrition, with multi-stakeholder initiatives such as the Scaling Up Nutrition 
(SUN) movement, initiated in 2010 or the establishment of organisations, like the Global 
Alliance for Improved Nutrition (GAIN) (Hoddinott et al. 2015), with a strong focus on 
reducing undernutrition by engaging the private sector. In this context, the Government of 
Tanzania became one of the first members of the SUN movement in 2011, and a focus 
country of USAID’s Feed the Future initiative – a multi-year, multi-country programme 
focused on targeting global hunger and food security. 
This case study focuses on the government efforts to incentivise and engage the private 
sector to reach a social goal, increase nutrition intake by the population, through the Food 
Fortification Action Plan, which required the food industry in Tanzania to fortify all wheat 
flour, maize flour and edible oil. Food fortification is seen as a cost-effective strategy to 
reduce prevalence of micronutrient deficiencies, and aimed to reduce stunting by 15 per cent 
by 2015. The case study will focus on and analyse the coordinative and facilitative state–
business negotiation to leverage the wheat and maize flour industry resources and engage 
them to fortify their products, with the aim of reducing undernutrition. These relations had 




The Tanzania Food and Drugs Authority (TFDA) is the government’s organisation 
responsible for delivering quality assurance and quality control by the private sector. The 
TFDA has offices representing each geographical area of Tanzania (seven in total), five 
outside and two in Dar es Salaam. 
Large flour processors in Tanzania control 94 per cent of the wheat flour market, which is 
very concentrated. Bakhresa and Azania Mohamed Enterprises, both Tanzanian companies, 
are among the three largest wheat processors in the country. Bakhresa is also a key player 
in Eastern, Central and Southern sub-Saharan Africa. In contrast, the maize flour market is 
very diffuse, where ten firms control 5 per cent of the market, and is dominated by the 
informal sector and small millers. 
The National Food Fortification Alliance (NFFA), created in 2003, is a multi-stakeholder 
platform that served as the forum where the public sector and industry discussed the 
regulations to be implemented as the Food Fortification Action Plan was developed and 
adopted by the government in 2009. 
 Government members: Ministry of Health and Social Welfare, Ministry of Industries 
and Trade, Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security (now Ministry of Agriculture, 
Livestock and Fisheries), Tanzania Bureau of Standards, Tanzania Food and Drugs 
Authority, Tanzania Food and Nutrition Center, Small Industries Development 
Organisation. 
 Private sector includes a range of large local companies, such as: Power Foods 
(blended cereal products), Tropical Foods (processed fruits and vegetables), 
Bakhresa, Azania Mohamed Enterprises, Tanzania Chamber of Commerce, 
Industries and Agriculture, food manufacturers, processors, and Consumer 
Association. 
 Civil society, academia and international donors, including: Sokoine University of 
Agriculture; International Health Food Association; Helen Keller International; and 
UNICEF, WFP, World Bank. 
International donors that support the establishment of the food fortification agenda, such as 
the World Bank, are central to the development of the Food Fortification Action Plan, 
providing funds and technical support. Support also came from GAIN, an international 
organisation launched in 2002 to tackle malnutrition. GAIN established a ‘Premix31 Hub’ in 
Dar es Salaam in 2011, to supply food manufacturers with the required premix, ensuring an 
affordable and good quality supply. 
State–business relations shaping the nutrition agenda in Tanzania 
Tanzania’s efforts to reduce undernutrition have been highly dependent on international aid 
since the beginning. Tanzania’s NNS was actively supported by other donors – almost 
US$76.7m from the US, as part of their Feed the Future programme and the New Alliance for 
Food Security and Nutrition, US$2m from the World Bank and US$2.69m from the 
Government of Japan (Bleggi 2014). Donors are increasingly calling for private sector 
involvement in national nutrition systems. Tanzania has been a pioneer in the region in 
introducing a strong role for the private sector within the NNS. 
The focus of this case is on the coordinative and positive state–business relations that led to 
the creation of the Food Fortification Action Plan and its implementation, as well as a brief 
analysis of its mixed results. This case study shows how the state drove the relations by 
seeking, successfully, to leverage private sector resources and skills, with the aim of, 
                                                
31 Mix of nutrients added to the flour in order for it to be fortified. 
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unsuccessfully, achieving the social goal of reducing undernutrition by increasing nutritious 
food products in the markets. Also, these relations are influenced by international donors, 
shaping how government expenditure is allocated, what the final policies will look like and 
who will benefit from them. 
State–business relations on the Food Fortification Action Plan 
The NFFA, established in 2003, attracted strong support from development partners. After 
six years of meetings, the NFFA, on May 2009, supported by two consultants from the World 
Bank, started developing the Food Fortification Action Plan. It included an overview of 
malnutrition in Tanzania, a cost-benefit analysis for the government and the private sector of 
the introduction of a food fortification strategy in the country, and a roadmap ‘to make food 
fortification a reality in Tanzania’ (World Bank 2009). The plan was presented to a High-Level 
Forum in September 2009, including representatives from the central government, key 
international donors (World Bank, World Food Programme), and other stakeholders, such as 
private sector or civil society organisations. They decided that: 
A concerted effort is needed by all stakeholders to implement the Food Fortification 
Action Plan and get started on food fortification in Tanzania. An important outcome of 
this meeting should be the endorsement of the action plan by stakeholders, and a 
consensus on the essential next steps and the timetable for moving forward quickly 
with this essential intervention. 
(The Chief Medical Officer, as chair, on behalf of the Permanent Secretary, Prime 
Minister’s Office, quoted in World Bank 2009) 
This shows how, from the outset, the nutrition agenda in Tanzania was encouraged strongly 
by international aid donors. Another example came when the World Bank threatened to 
remove the US$2m donation if the Food Fortification Plan was not enforced on time, so in 
2011 the Minister of Health and Social Welfare signed the national regulation and the 
enforcement started in May 2013 (Bleggi 2014). 
The Plan was set to be implemented by the private sector, with support from the government 
and international donors. It passed legislation that makes it compulsory for all food 
processors in Tanzania to fortify wheat and maize flour and edible oil. It, implicitly, was 
mandating the private sector to deliver a social objective (reduce undernutrition by producing 
fortified flour products with micronutrients), incentivising them to comply with the regulations 
by enforcing the law, supporting them to acquire the premix and providing technical 
assistance to learn how to fortify. The logic underlying mandatory fortification is that by 
creating an even playing field through regulation, government can simplify the constraints 
that businesses face to deliver nutritious food. Also, the cost of food fortification is assumed 
to be very low for the companies, particularly given government support. 
To ensure the implementation of the new regulations, the government gave incentives to 
companies to support them to comply, such as a tax exemption for imported premix to 
support the acquisition of the premix and the dossifiers.32 Also, GAIN established a ‘Premix 
Hub’ in Dar es Salaam, to give local food producers access to affordable and high-quality 
premix in a cost-effective way. It is easily accessible to large manufacturers located near Dar 
es Salaam. Finally, support from former President Kikwete helped attract the attention of 
industry decision-makers, and the NFFA advocated for the industry to adopt and sustain the 
new food-fortification practices. 
                                                
32 A ‘dossifier’ is the dispenser installed on the mill to ensure correct rate of premix is added to the flour. 
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Who can comply with the legislation? Who benefits from it? 
Overall, achieving effective fortification within large industry and a concentrated sector is less 
costly and complex than for a very diffuse sector. Often, for the government it is easier to 
support large-scale manufacturers to enable them to easily adapt to the new legislations, at 
reduced costs. However, micro and small millers will not be able comply with the legislation, 
as these imply a costly and complex process for them. In Tanzania the food market is divided 
between the large-scale, industrial manufacturing that produces wheat flour; and the micro- 
or small-scale processing plants, that produce maize flour. Furthermore, in Tanzania it is 
small enterprises, not large industries that provide products for the majority of the rural and 
urban poor (see Table B1). Both Bakhresa and Azania produced maize flour, but 
discontinued after the mandatory fortification policy started. 
Table B1 Market characteristics in Tanzania 
Flour type Type of company Degree of 
concentration 
Target population Complying with 
fortification 
Wheat flour Large food processor Concentrated – two 
firms control 94% 
Urban middle and high 
income 
Yes 
Maize flour Micro and small mills Diffuse – ten firms 
control 5% 
Rural and urban poor No 
Source: Adapted from Robinson and Nyagaya (2014). 
By 2015, six of the major companies where already fortifying their wheat products and 
complying with the legislation. As an example of industry’s support for this agenda, and the 
good relations between the government and the industry, President Kikwete announced the 
start of the fortification campaign from the main wheat flour factory of the country, Bakhresa’s 
Buguruni Flour Mill (Bakhresa Group 2013). In addition, Bakhresa was the first company to 
start fortifying its products (Robinson et al. 2014). 
In spite of this success, available evidence suggests that the poor do not buy their products 
from any of these companies. Poor people consume maize flour, and most of it (80 per cent) 
is processed by micro and small mills (Trevor and Wilson 2015). Maize flour is also a key 
ingredient for complementary foods, consumed by 70 per cent of breastfed infants and       
80 per cent of non-breastfed infants between the ages of six and 23 months. Lack of proper 
complementary feeding is one of the major causes of undernutrition in the country (Temu et 
al. 2014). As of 2015, there was no evidence that maize flour was being fortified. 
Small millers cannot access the premix itself, as GAIN’s facility is not accessible to them. 
Furthermore, the current Tanzanian regulation system is too complex for SMEs – pushing 
them potentially out of the markets (from registration to fortification), as only a handful of 
small maize millers are registered with the Tanzanian regulatory agencies, the TFDA and the 
Tanzania Bureau of Standards (Temu et al. 2014). As of today, the government has not 
managed to enforce the regulations in the informal markets, and the TFDA (enforcement 
body) is not able to fulfil their role, as they are short on staff and equipment33 (Robinson and 
Nyagaya 2014). 
A USAID programme, Tuboreshe Chakula (2011–15), with a budget of US$22m, aimed to 
upgrade SMEs and facilitate fortification for maize flour with very little success. It worked with 
more than 700 SMEs across three regions (Dodoma, Manyara, Morogoro), and as of early 
2014, none of the enterprises participating had been able to undertake fortification. 
According to the assessment of project managers, small enterprises will not fortify unless 
                                                
33 The TFDA is expected to monitor as many as 1,000 or 2,000 maize flour millers, with only four offices outside Dar es Salaam 
and one regional office with two inspectors. 
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there is higher demand for the fortified products or strict enforcement (Robinson and Pittore 
2015). 
Although several businesses are making products fortified with micronutrients, these target 
middle and higher income consumers who are willing and able to pay a higher price. It has 
been observed that the larger firms are selling their products at high prices, offsetting their 
costs by marketing their products as premium quality brands – helping them differentiate 
from the informal sector and sell to middle-higher income consumers (Maestre et al. 2014). 
Furthermore, as shown above, an excess in regulation can end up driving small and micro-
processors out of business, as they try to comply with the new legislation and upgrade their 
facilities to the required standards. It is clear that small businesses are crucial in reducing 
undernutrition among Tanzania’s poorest communities. In Tanzania, the majority of the 
complementary foods in rural areas are made from unfortified cereals and do not provide 
enough energy or micronutrients (Temu et al. 2014). Even for large companies it is difficult to 
compete with cheaper, unfortified products made by small businesses, given the high 
distribution costs for rural areas. 
Conclusions – implications 
This case shows that while state–business relations can be coordinative and positive, the 
final goal of the government may fail. The risk is that by excluding certain voices from the 
discussions and the policy design, the final outcome – while well intentioned – will result in 
unintended consequences for the targeted population. This is a case where the state, 
influenced and supported by international donors, sought to leverage private sector 
resources and skills to achieve a social objective. While the relations were successful, the 
state policy succeeded in fortifying wheat flour but failed in reaching poor consumers with it, 
hence not achieving its public policy goal overall. In this case, it ended up resulting in 
increased sales and business reputations for the private sector, an increased expenditure on 




Annex C – Case study: The creation of a 
financial inclusion sector in India 
Financial inclusion is widely celebrated as a private sector initiative for inclusive development 
(for example, Accenture and CARE 2016; Ehrbeck 2014). But in reality it is more complex, 
with both private and public sector organisations negotiating and shaping different 
approaches for connecting poor and marginalised people to financial services. Financial 
inclusion efforts in India have sought to turn the poor into viable clients for the financial 
system, aiming for them to borrow at lower interest rates, accumulate capital through savings 
and more recently, use digital payment services. 
Since the colonial age, first the British and then Indian administrations sought to expand 
access to finance, hoping to alleviate inequality and rural–urban divisions (Turnell 2005; Teki 
and Mishra 2012). Financial services, particularly credit, were long used (or abused) as a 
form of social policy. India’s rapid economic growth since liberalisation has been extremely 
unequal, focused on urban centres and the export-oriented service sector (which accounts 
for 8 per cent of GDP and 30 per cent of exports); and the IT and business services sector in 
particular (Hyvonen and Wang 2012). However, two thirds of India’s population live in rural 
areas, as do 86 per cent of the country’s poor (Alkire et al. 2014). Agriculture still employs 
half of the nation’s workforce, and accounts for a (declining) share of only 18 per cent of 
output (World Bank Indicators). Farmers and unskilled labourers find themselves increasingly 
superfluous to the expanding high-skilled urban economy (Taylor 2011). 
Given this economic structure, Indian development strategy is generally negotiated between 
(mostly) higher-class politicians and urban business elites. These state–business elites view 
a more ‘inclusive’ financial system for all Indians as a remedy for rural underdevelopment, 
poverty and lack of opportunity that comes at low cost to the state and without redistribution. 
Beyond creating an ‘enabling environment’, the state has actively shaped the agenda for the 
private sector’s engagement. As with food fortification in Tanzania (see above), this entailed 
the state pursuing social policy goals through the activities of certain kinds of business. 
Core programmes and evolution of microfinance in India34 
Since the 1980s, three sets of initiatives have been particularly important: self-help groups 
(SHGs), microfinance (through MFIs), and recent mass banking initiatives. Thanks to large 
commercial MFIs, India is now (with Bangladesh) the global heartland of financial inclusion, 
accounting for 42 per cent of the world’s microfinance borrowers.35 But India has also 
spawned some of the most notable episodes of harm and deviance in financial inclusion. 
Self-help groups (SHGs) 
SHGs organise women into groups large enough to access formal financial services at 
reasonable cost to the service provider (banks). By aggregating their individual savings into a 
single account and their credit needs into a single loan, SHGs lower the transaction costs 
(Christen et al. 2005). They started in Southern India, with Myrada (a parastatal agency that 
had managed mostly rural cooperatives) and the National Bank for Agriculture and Rural 
Development (NABARD) collaborating to support, organise and expand rural groups and link 
them to banks for loans. They obtained support from the World Bank and several Indian state 
governments. 
                                                
34 To ease readability, many facts and figures presented here are not referenced in detail; see Mader (2015: 160–94) for 
references. 
35 As registered by the database MIXMarket (www.themix.org/mixmarket/countries-regions/india, 22 June 2016). 
52 
SHG formation and bank linkages began in the 1980s and rapidly accelerated in the 2000s, 
particularly in four states in the south (Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Kerala and Karnataka). 
By the late 2000s, around 15 million SHGs, each comprising 10 to 15 women, had been 
linked with banks, borrowing around US$4.5bn in 2014/15; see Figure C1. 
Figure C1 Growth of the SHG–bank linkage 
 
Source: Adapted from Sa-Dhan (2015: 73). 
Microfinance institutions (MFIs) 
MFIs emerged amid the Indian NGO community in the late 1990s, with support from 
NABARD and the Reserve Bank of India (RBI), and were promoted as a means to obtain 
even lower transaction costs than through SHGs. They also worked through assembling 
borrowers into groups, but without forming independent entities with internal governance 
structures (like SHGs). 
MFIs worked strategically to bring domestic and international investor capital directly into 
lending to the poor, which led to a ‘gold rush’ among investors attracted to Indian MFIs’ 
extraordinarily high profitability (Wichterich 2012). They focused almost exclusively on credit. 
The growth was further encouraged by the government’s supportive but hands-off approach; 
it left microfinance unregulated. The government further incentivised investments in MFIs by 
declaring microfinance a ‘Priority Sector’ (more below). 
MFI growth was focused on the same states as SHGs, and often targeted the same groups, 
in a practice criticised as ‘poaching’ of borrower groups. By 2009, nearly one third of all MFI 
credit was located in Andhra Pradesh. MFIs grew rapidly from the early 2000s and expanded 
their lending by 61 to 106 per cent each year in the second half of the decade (see Figure 
C2), until in 2010 over-indebtedness and borrower revolts precipitated a repayment crisis 
and snap regulation in Andhra Pradesh. 
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Figure C2 Lending done by MFIs in India 
 
Source: Adapted from Mixmarket.org. 
Mass banking initiatives 
Recently, large government-led financial initiatives have sought to advance financial 
inclusion via the mainstream financial system, shifting the focus away from SHGs and MFIs. 
In 2011, the United Progressive Alliance government in Delhi launched a campaign called 
Swabhimaan to bring formal banking to everyone. 
This was revamped by incoming Prime Minister Narendra Modi in 2014 with Pradhan Mantri 
Jan-Dhan Yojana (PMJDY – ‘Prime Minister’s People’s Money Scheme’), which focuses on 
making it easier for individuals to open bank accounts, access insurance benefits, get debit 
cards and gain overdraft facilities of up to 5,000 Rupees (Sa-Dhan 2015: 1). One key change 
was that while the ‘Swabhimaan scheme […] focused on villages, the PMJDY focuses on 
households, thereby covering both urban and rural areas’ (Awasthi 2015: 338). PMJDY, the 
‘largest financial inclusion scheme in the world’, aims for universal no-frills bank account 
coverage, working mainly through the public banks sector but also private banks (Nair and 
Tankha 2015: xiii). The opening of more than 18 million new bank accounts in the first week 
was recorded in the Guinness Book of World Records.36 
Financial inclusion in India: state activism and state–business 
interdependence 
The evolution of financial inclusion programming in India can be read as sequential 
negotiations between an activist state and an often more reactive business side (specifically, 
                                                
36 www.guinnessworldrecords.com/news/2015/1/india-makes-financial-world-record-as-millions-open-new-bank-accounts. 
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owners of financial capital) about where capital goes, to whom and at what price, and thus 
ultimately the terms on which business contributes towards social policy.37 
The state has actively pushed financial inclusion, albeit until recently more through ad hoc 
measures and policies – such as SHG and MFI promotion – than through explicit strategies. 
Only in India’s 11th and 12th Five Year Plans (2008; 2013) did ‘inclusive growth’ and 
‘financial inclusion’ come to feature prominently (Arun and Kamath 2015: 275). But different 
governments and levels of government have at least since the early 1990s used sticks and 
carrots – such as subsidies, legal obligations and public banking – to entice the financial 
sector to do more business with poor and rural populations. As Rao and Anand (cited in Arun 
and Kamath 2015: 276) say, ‘the idea of financial inclusion had existed in essence, albeit, 
without the nomenclature, even before the [2008–2013] reforms’. 
The central government’s Priority Sector regulation, originally introduced in 1972 and 
expanded throughout the 1970s and 1980s, has also massively encouraged the push for 
financial inclusion. It stipulates that banks in India must allocate at least 40 per cent of their 
net credit (32 per cent for foreign banks) at preferential rates to certain targets, among which 
are agriculture, small businesses, infrastructure, self-employed persons, education, housing, 
microcredit and disadvantaged social groups. Priority Sector rules, a salient feature of India’s 
financial system, have long been a sticking point in negotiations between financial actors and 
the state, particularly due to the costs they entail for banks (Nathan Associates 2013). Banks 
thus warmly welcomed microfinance and financial inclusion as counting towards Priority 
Sector targets, because of the reliable and easy returns that could be earned relative to other 
areas. Indian banks became keenly involved in financial inclusion particularly through loans 
to MFIs (Chen et al. 2010), but could also meet their targets by subscribing to bond issues 
from NABARD, which channelled capital onward to MFIs or into the SHG system. MFIs in 
turn have consistently lobbied to retain ‘Priority’ status, because it ensured access to 
abundant cheap capital (Mader 2013). 
There is no single key forum of interaction or policy dialogue between the state and other 
actors over financial inclusion in India. A key broker in negotiations about how financial 
inclusion is to work, however, has been the RBI, which has increasingly pushed for a bank-
led model for achieving financial inclusion, through no-frills accounts, correspondent banking, 
new branches and relaxation of norms. This comes after many years of support for SHGs 
and microfinance; in 2000, for example, the RBI freed all MFIs registered as for-profit non-
bank financial companies (NBFC) from key regulations, including minimum capital or liquidity 
requirements, on the condition that they refrain from deposit-taking. This state support for 
MFIs led to the rapid expansion of commercial credit-driven microfinance in the 2000s. 
Contrasting with the heavy-handedness of Priority Sector rules, until recently the Indian 
central government has pursued a decidedly hands-off approach to regulating financial 
inclusion itself. Instead of regulating microfinance, for instance, successive governments 
emphasised MFIs’ self-regulation, use of industry standards and voluntary codes of conduct. 
These rules were developed by industry representative bodies such as the Microfinance 
Institutions Network (MFIN) and Sa-Dhan, often at the behest of government (Rozas and 
Sinha 2010). The representative bodies, meanwhile, have resisted attempts to regulate MFIs 
and insisted on the sector’s capacity to self-regulate, even in the face of multiple crises 
culminating in 2010 (Arunachalam 2011; Mader 2013). 
Only in its recent massive drive for universal financial access (programmes such as 
Swabhimaan and PMJDY) has the state again clearly taken the legislative initiative, albeit to 
actively push or enforce (not contain) financial expansion. The PMJDY Mission Document 
                                                
37 Whether financial inclusion is actually effective, ineffective, or harmful is another question (see, for instance, Mader 2015, 
2016). 
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describes the initiative as a ‘national mission’ encompassing different stakeholders, including 
central government departments, the RBI, banks and bank associations, NABARD, and 
regional and local governments and banking committees (GoI 2014: 34–44). PMJDY 
depends on the compliance of the banking sector, but it is unclear what, apart from sheer 
legal stipulation, incentivises banks to offer accounts and services to the poor. The 
consequences of denying service or other instructions are unclear. A notice published by the 
Ministry of Finance announced: 
This is to inform all concerned that if anyone wishes to open an account under 
PMJDY, he/she may visit to the nearest bank’s Branch / Bank Mitrs [agent office] and 
can open his/her account… if anyone is facing any problem/difficulty in opening of 
bank accounts, he/she may write to Mission Office, PMJDY or can register his/her 
grievance/complaint online on our website pmjdy.gov.in (write to us) or call at the 
numbers listed below.38 
PMJDY is effectively financial inclusion by decree, but without transparent enforcement. This 
may nonetheless work, because India’s financial sector remains strongly state-dominated 
(Shimizu 2010).39 Public sector banks account for more than two thirds of all banking sector 
assets (down from more than 90 per cent in 1980). Likely because of the more direct 
capacity for government control, the vast majority of the PMJDY roll-out has gone ahead 
through public sector banks and (also government-led) regional rural banks. 















Public sector banks 104.5	 80.22	 180.68	 330.6	 24.47	
Regional rural banks 30.52	 5.8	 40.9	 71.4	 21.05	
Private banks 5.2	 3.3	 8.4	 152.4	 36.47	
Total 140.49	 90.13	 230.62	 417.2	 24.31	
Note: 1 billion INR = approximately US$15m. 
Source: Adapted from http://pmjdy.gov.in/account. 
Despite the government’s reports of success, claiming that 230 million accounts have been 
opened in less than two years (see Table C1), the situation on the ground remains opaque. 
For instance, several Indian states have claimed 100 per cent coverage of households with 
bank accounts, but investigations for The Hindu newspaper revealed poor people faced 
serious difficulties when opening bank accounts; bank employees, business correspondents 
and households often were even unaware of the scheme (Venkatesan 2015). In mid-2015, 
CGAP (the World Bank’s microfinance agency) reported that bank correspondents and 
banks were making a loss on PMJDY-related activities (Bakshi et al. 2015). In short, while 
the government is now driving financial inclusion and is reporting successes, the actual 
progress is uncertain. 
Conclusions – implications 
India is today widely recognised as a global leader in financial inclusion, boasting rapid 
expansion of access to services. Its pathway of financial inclusion shows a protracted 
process of interdependent negotiation between the state and business (the financial sector), 
                                                
38 Downloaded from: www.pmjdy.gov.in/, 12 August 2016 
39 This should not be taken to suggest that the sector is static or statist. Due to the promotion of competition and market 
discipline, public and private sector banks in India show little difference in terms of earnings performance, efficiency and 
soundness (Shimizu 2010). 
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in which the state had an interest in deploying financial access as a palliative for social 
inequality, and financial business actors had an interest in acquiring new clients. These 
objectives may be either aligned or in conflict, depending on the conditions, as the 
spectacular episodes of both expansion and breakdown of financial inclusion initiatives show. 
The implementation of SHG, MFI and mass banking initiatives represent different negotiated 
outcomes of how financial development in India is to proceed. Overall, the case 
demonstrates how such initiatives which are commonly associated with ‘business’ 
approaches to poverty reduction often in fact reflect public policy choices that shape state–
business relations. In this case, the state engaged in ‘pro-market activism’, pursuing social 
policy through expanding the reach of (financial) business. 
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Annex D – Case study: Private commercial 
farms and public land in Ethiopia 
With just over 100 million people, Ethiopia is the second most populous country in Africa, 
second to Nigeria. Its government is a federal parliamentary republic, with nine self-
governing regions and two city administrations. Following the fall of the communist regime in 
1991, the government has been ruled by the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic 
Front (EPRDF). 
The communist regime (aka Derg)40 (1974–91) nationalised land and large-scale 
manufacturing and service industries. It left a diminutive formal private sector, with a large 
informal sector running alongside. Shortly after 1991, the EPRDF-led government 
implemented a series of policies to develop the private sector. It opened up sectors reserved 
for the state to the private sector but retained ownership of land and the provision of key 
services like power and infrastructure (FDRE 1995; Ayele 2003). It also introduced market-
oriented policies and strategies. In the 2000s, it embraced the ‘developmental state’ 
approach, and went on to play an even more active role in the economy. It envisioned 
reaching middle-income status by 2025, reducing poverty along the way and attaining major 
development goals (Rahmato 2014). 
Implementation of a series of strategies such as Agriculture Development-led 
Industrialisation (ADLI) and the recently concluded Growth and Transformation Plan (FDRE 
2010) led Ethiopia to register a 10.9 per cent average annual economic growth over 2004–
2015, and reduce poverty levels from 39 to 22.2 per cent, meeting many of the Millennium 
Development Goals. With 40 per cent of GDP, agriculture accounts for the lion’s share of 
exports and employs at least three in four Ethiopians (World Bank 2016). As food security 
remained Ethiopia’s goal, the government provided smallholders with improved inputs such 
as seeds and irrigation and promoted non-farm rural employment. ADLI had a limited export 
orientation, and participation of the private sector in agriculture was likewise limited. 
Consequently, Ethiopian agriculture remained dominated by smallholder farmers operating 
on two hectares or fewer. It also remained rain-fed, low-input and low-output. 
The government’s drive towards commercial farming came around 2001, as it moved to 
attract foreign capital into agriculture and catalyse a rural transformation from subsistence to 
commercial farming. The strategy was two-pronged: first in the cut flower sector, and second 
in large-scale commercial farming. The latter focused on three areas: export-oriented food 
crops including rice and maize; biofuel crops including palm oil and caster beans; and 
industrial crops, notably sugar cane and cotton41 (Rahmato 2014; FDRE 2010). 
This case study focuses on this sustained growth period since the turn of the century, and 
explores state–business relations in the emerging private commercial farm sector. In these 
particular relations, the government aimed to increase domestic and foreign investment to 
promote growth, employment, etc. In return for business engagement in its programmes, it 
provided fiscal and non-fiscal incentives including subsidised access to land. Business, for its 
part, had various aims, including the creation of a competitive environment for business, and 
the reduction of risk of failure of business. Overall, the case study shows that while 
government-driven strategy led to some success, it also encountered problems around land 
use and from adverse effects on the livelihoods of communities. 
                                                
40 Derg (or dergue) is an Amharic term that refers to a military committee or council that ruled Ethiopia from 1974 to 1987. 
41 Most cotton and sugar cane farms are government-run and are not covered in this case study. 
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State–business relations in the private commercial farm sector 
Core actors42 
(a) The Ethiopian Horticulture Producer Exporters Association (EHPEA)43 – The aim is 
to promote the competitiveness of the Ethiopian horticulture sector within the global market 
while at the same time addressing members’ common concerns in production and marketing. 
At its start in 2002, the association had five members; by 2014 it had 94 member producers 
and exporters, covering 80 per cent of all flower farmers and exporters. 
(b) The Ethiopian Horticulture Development Agency (EHDA) – Founded in 2008 to 
provide strategic support to the industry, facilitating global markets and building the capacity 
of investors in areas such as cold chain management and logistics. It aims to see Ethiopia as 
a prime choice in the international horticulture export market by 2025.44 
(c) The Agricultural Investment Land Administration Agency (AILAA) – Formerly known 
as the Agricultural Investment Support Directorate (AISD), created under the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Rural Development in 2009. It coordinates and provides technical and 
administrative support to investors. It is a ‘one-stop shop’ for land acquisition, including 
identification and delineation of potential agricultural investment areas.45 
Processes and events 
Historically, business and EPRDF-led government relations have been fractious and 
shrouded in mistrust (SIDA 2004; Mihretu and Tolina 2015). Part of the business community 
perceives that it has not been fairly treated, suggesting that a few (often party-affiliated) have 
been favoured. Apart from symbolic ‘consultation’ processes, business also felt that it did not 
sufficiently contribute to policymaking, including on business registration and licencing 
procedures. The government questioned the ability of businesses to contribute to its policies 
and strategies. However, a formal dialogue between state and business was initiated in 2002 
with the start of the Public-Private Consultative Forum (SIDA 2004). Although the Forum 
brought together the then Ministry of Industry and Trade and the Ethiopian Chamber of 
Commerce and Sectoral Associations, open and critical review of policies did not start until 
2010. Since then the Forum successfully facilitated dialogue between the state and business, 
leading to improved customs procedures, business licencing and registration processes 
(Mihretu and Tolina 2015). 
Turning to state–business relations in the commercial farm sector following its strategy on 
commercial farming, the government took a series of measures to engage with business. 
First, it created EDHA and AILAA (and its predecessor AISD) and strengthened other related 
agencies executing the policy. The Ethiopian Investment Authority (now Commission) and 
agencies such as the Ethiopian Revenue and Customs were reorganised to meet the needs 
of business. Second, the government actively courted international and domestic investors to 
engage in commercial farming (Keeley et al. 2014). Executive members of the federal and 
regional governments, and relevant agencies, held a series of conferences with business to 
introduce the policy and tax-based incentives and to discuss issues related to land access. 
Information on business opportunities was passed to potential investors. The government 
also conducted a coordinated and sustained business diplomacy effort aimed at international 
business. A Business Diplomacy Directorate was set up within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
Diplomatic missions in major capital cities, where a large contingent of Ethiopian diaspora 
                                                
42 Many state and non-state actors – indigenous communities, NGOs, researchers, etc. – also influenced both policy and 
execution. 
43 See: www.ehpea.org/ 
44 See: www.ehda.gov.et/web/guest/home 
45 See: www.moa.gov.et/en_GB/agricultural-investment-directorate 
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and potential investors are based, were targeted. High-level government officials (including 
the president and prime minister) paid visits to target countries and met with respective 
government and business representatives. They also held side meetings with business 
leaders at the UN Summit and Davos events. 
Businesses too, individually and collectively, engaged with the government. For example, a 
meeting between the late Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi and Pierre Castel, founder 
and president of the Castel Group and BGI International, led to the successful establishment 
of the Castel Winery business in Ethiopia.46 The cut flower sector, represented by EHPEA, 
successfully lobbied the government to develop a five-year sector strategy and provide 
access to land and credit, as well as coordinating with Ethiopian Airlines to ship flowers to 
European markets. Investors in large farms, however, did not have a formal association nor 
did they approach the government in an organised fashion. 
The political economy of state ownership of land and the land 
‘market’ 
The main arena of state–business interaction in Ethiopia is concerned with access to land. 
Because of their great importance to the livelihoods of a large segment of the population, 
access to and use of land have been contested for generations. Since 1991, EPRDF have 
argued that private ownership of land dispossesses the peasants of land and leads to urban 
unemployment (Rahmato 2014; Ayele 2003). Following this, in the 1995 constitution land 
was retained under the ownership of the state. Furthermore, constitutional power over the 
acquisition and transfer of land was placed under the regional governments (FRDE 1995). 
Today, land is only transferred by lease, as sale is prohibited by law, and the sole supplier of 
land is the state. Land leasing involves a long bureaucratic process, and altering the order of 
applications has been a common practice, allowing certain businesses to jump the queue by 
quasi-legal or illegal means. However, in 2009, responding to investors’ complaints about the 
complexity of obtaining land, the Federal Government set up a ‘land bank’, administered 
under AILAA, to transfer land of 5,000 hectares or more (Rahmato 2014). Different factors 
enter into land lease negotiations: location, quality and size of land, duration of lease period, 
and other conditions of use. In theory, land leasing can be done by auction in an open and 
transparent manner; however, as details about the land in question are often unknown, the 
government leases land through negotiations. Lease deals were made at what many 
regarded as ‘giveaway prices’ – around US$2/ha/year for 25 to 45 years (Oakland Institute 
2011).47 But investors still complain about the time it takes to process lease deals – 
according to a UNDP study, these took an average of a year, unless speeded up by 
payments to officials, which typically reduced the time to 232 days (UNDP 2013). 
The emerging private commercial farms 
The government aimed to attract capital, technology and expertise, and create jobs, expand 
food production and reduce poverty. But what did the policy on private commercial farming 
and state–business relations produce? Evidence on the number and size of farms, 
employment, production etc. are hard to come by; the brief below mainly refers to numbers of 
farms. 
The ideal location for cut flower farms is high-altitude, flat land with a cool climate. The sector 
also needs to be close to reasonably well-developed infrastructure to access domestic and 
international markets, and near urban centres with high potential labour force. Such factors 
                                                
46 See details here: www.investethiopia.gov.et/stories/success-stories. 
47 Oakland Institute (2011) showed land lease rates in Ethiopia ranged from US$1.25–40 per ha/year whereas the African 
average ranged US$350–800 per ha/year. 
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led cut flower farms to be set up in pre-urban areas, particularly close to Addis Ababa 
(Rahmato 2014; Oqubay 2015). From five farms involved in the production and export of cut 
flowers in 2003, the sector grew to about 100 in 2014. Exports also grew from three tons in 
2003/04 to more than 50,000 tons in 2011/12, generating close to US$1bn in export 
earnings. However, farm sizes are small, often under 500 hectares, but labour-intensive. 
From 2007 to 2012, the sector’s employment doubled from 25,000 to 50,484; 70 per cent of 
these employees were female (Oqubay 2015; Gebreeyesus and Lizuka 2010). 
Oqubay (2015) singled out ‘state activism’ and ‘industrial policy’ as key success factors in the 
cut flower sector. For him, government commitment (or political will) led to the development 
of a strategy for the sector; on the positive interplay between businesses and the state, he 
noted the industry ‘picked the state’ and the state ‘picked the firms’. Nonetheless, business – 
notably its association – played an equally crucial role in promoting competition among 
members while at the same time putting members’ common concerns to the government. 
The foreign direct investment (FDI) that was attracted to Ethiopia – the single-minded joint 
business–state focus on export, development of performance standards, etc. – was also a 
key explanation of the birth and subsequent success of the sector. In a nutshell, success was 
a product of effective state–business relations. 
Large-scale commercial farms, on the other hand, emerged during the post 2007–08 food 
price and supply crisis when, according to Rahmato (2014:26), the government wanted to 
benefit from opportunities opened up by the crisis. Food volatility and price rises drove 
businesses and food importing countries to look for secured food sources overseas. 
Investors came mainly from emerging economies, notably India, the Middle East and the 
diaspora. 
Deininger and Byerlee (2011) estimate that around 406 large-scale commercial farmlands 
were leased, occupying approximately 1.19 million hectares (although Rahmato (2014) 
mentions 3 million to 3.5 million hectares). Significant land leases were taken out, particularly 
in sparsely populated regions such as Benisgangul-Gumz and Gambella. Eight leases were 
for more than 25,000 hectares; one was more than 100,000 hectares. Many commented that 
these large farms were ‘unmanageable’ and adversely affected pastoralists and semi-
pastoralists (Keeley et al. 2014). Estimates show that no more than a third of leased farms 
(and far fewer in terms of area) have become operational.48 It has also been reported that 
land is being used for speculative purposes (Keeley et al. 2014). 
The question remains: why was the ‘state activism’ that worked for cut flowers ineffective in 
the case of large-scale commercial farms? Studies are limited, but the emerging evidence is 
startling: large-scale commercial farming was conceived to produce export crops. However, 
neither capital nor knowledge and expertise came in as expected. Some farms became too 
large to manage, and weak land governance and regulation meant that new owners obtained 
deals for speculative purposes (Rahmato 2014; Oakland Institute 2011). The Oakland 
Institute (ibid.) in particular has consistently called it a ‘land-grabbing’ policy which threatened 
communities, wildlife and the broader environment. Its research details a list of unmet goals, 
including no improvement in food security, forest lands being cleared or burned, and wildlife 
habitat lost. Finally, unlike in the cut flower sector, large-scale farmers did not have a 
collective voice to put their predicaments to the government. In effect, weak state–business 
relations contributed to what is emerging as failed large-scale commercial farming. 
Conclusions – implications 
Two turning points in Ethiopia’s recent past, namely changes in government in 1974 and 
1991, fundamentally changed the climate for business: the former stifled business, while the 
                                                
48 See: https://ig.ft.com/sites/land-rush-investment/ethiopia/ 
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latter allowed it to perform, but with some restrictions. Moreover, the state decided whom to 
support and where, and which products and markets. By virtue of its power over resources, 
the state determined the prices of critical inputs such as land, and leased it at subsidised 
rates in exchange for new capital, knowledge and expertise. 
The government’s formal acceptance of business as a partner in growth and development 
efforts was the starting point for positive state–business relations. Where interactions were 
sustained and collaborated through EHPEA (the business association) and competition 
within business was maintained, more success was registered. Preliminary evidence also 
suggested that state promotion of, and engagement with, large commercial investors was not 
overly successful. The few farms that were set up adversely affected the livelihoods of 
indigenous communities, forest land and wildlife. What the government promoted as 
‘transformational’ for Ethiopian agriculture has been seriously contested, particularly by rights 




Abdel-Latif, A. and Schmitz, H. (2009) State-Business Relations and Investment in Egypt, 
IDS Research Report 61, Brighton: IDS 
Accenture and CARE (2016) Within Reach: How Banks in Emerging Economies can Grow 
Profitably by Being More Inclusive, London: CARE 
Alfredson, T. and Cungu, A. (2008) Negotiation Theory and Practice: A Review of the 
Literature, Rome: Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations 
Alkire, S.; Chatterjee, M.; Conconi, A.; Seth, S.; Vaz, A. (2014) Poverty in Rural and Urban 
Areas: Direct comparisons using the global MPI 2014, Oxford: Oxford Poverty & Human 
Development Initiative 
Anyimadu, A. (2016) Politics and Development in Tanzania. Shifting the Status Quo, Africa 
Programme, Chatham House 
Armijo, L.E. and Fauber, P. (2002) ‘“We Have a Consensus”: Explaining Political Support for 
Market Reform in Latin America’, Latin American Politics and Society 44.2: 1–40 
Arun, T. and Kamath, R. (2015) ‘Financial Inclusion: Policies and Practices’, IIMB 
Management Review 27: 267–87 
Arunachalam, R.S. (2011) The Journey of Indian Micro-Finance: Lessons for the Future, 
Chennai: Aapti Publications 
Awasthi, A. (2015) ‘Comparative Analysis of Pradhan Mantri Jan Dhan Yojana’, Advances in 
Economics and Business Management 2.4: 336–40 
Ayele, S. (2003) ‘Enterprise Development Incentives and State-Business Relations in 
Ethiopia’, in Uhling, Siegbert (eds), Proceedings of the XVth International Conference of 
Ethiopian Studies, Hamburg, 20–25 July 2003 
Bakhresa Group (2013) His Excellency the President of Tanzania, Dkt. Jakaya Mrisho 
Kikwete Visits Azam Flour Mill to Launch their Food Fortification Campaign, 
http://bakhresa.com/his-excellency-the-president-of-tanzania-dkt-jakaya-mrisho-kikwete-
visits-africas-largest-flour-mill-to-launch-their-food-fortification-campaign (accessed                
3 October 2016) 
Bakshi, P.; Sharma, M. and Wright, G. (2015) ‘What’s Undermining India’s Financial 
Inclusion Progress?’, CGAP Blog, 5 June 2015, www.cgap.org/blog/ (accessed 1 November 
2016) 
Bhutta, Z.A.; Das, J.K.; Rizvi, A.; Gaffey, M.F.; Walker, N.; Horton, S.; Webb, P.; Lartey, A. 
and Black, R.E. (2013) ‘Evidence-based Interventions for Improvement of Maternal and Child 
Nutrition: What Can Be Done and at What Cost?’, The Lancet 382.9890: 452–77 
Bleggi, S. (2014) ‘Learning from U.S. Nutrition Investments in Tanzania: Progress and 
Partnerships’, Bread for the World, 1 January 2014, Washington DC: Bread for the World 
Block, F. (2001) ‘Introduction’, in K. Polanyi (ed.), The Great Transformation: The Political 
and Economic Origins of Our Time, Boston: Beacon Press 
63 
Booth, D. (2015) ‘Towards a Developmental State Concept that is Fit for Purpose in the 21st 
Century’, paper presented to the ASA Annual Conference, Indianapolis, 20–22 November 
2014 
Bräutigam, D. and Zhang, H. (2013) ‘Green Dreams: Myth and Reality in China’s Agricultural 
Investment in Africa’, Third World Quarterly 34.9: 1676–96 
Bull, B. (2008) ‘Policy Networks and Business Participation in Free Trade Negotiations in 
Chile’, Journal of Latin American Studies 40: 195–224 
Cali, M. and Sen, K. (2011) ‘Do Effective State Business Relations Matter for Economic 
Growth? Evidence from Indian States’, World Development 39.9: 1542–57 
Cali, M.; Mitra, S. and Purohit, P. (2011) ‘Measuring State-Business Relations within 
Developing Countries: an Application to Indian States’, Journal of International Development 
23: 394–419 
Castells, M. (1992) ‘Four Asian Tigers with a Dragon Head: A Comparative Analysis of the 
State, Economy and Society in the Asian Pacific Rim’, in R. Henderson and J. Applebaum 
(eds), State and Development in the Asian Pacific Rim, London: Sage Publications 
Charles, G.; Jeppesen, S.; Kamau, P. and Kragelund, P. (2015) ‘Firm-level Perspectives on 
State-Business Relations in Africa: the Food-processing Sector in Kenya, Tanzania and 
Zambia’, www.cbs.dk/files/cbs.dk/sbrs_in_kenya_tanzania_zambia_version_23.pdf 
(accessed 18 October 2016) 
Chen, G.; Rasmussen, S. and Reille, X. (2010) Growth and Vulnerabilities in Microfinance, 
CGAP Focus Note 61, Washington DC: Consultative Group to Assist the Poor 
Christen, R.P.; Srinivasan, N. and Voorhies, R. (2005) ‘Managing to Go Down Market: 
Regulated Financial Institutions and the Move into Microsavings’, in M. Hirschland (ed.), 
Savings Services for the Poor: An Operational Guide, Bloomfield CT: Kumarian Press 
Clark, H. (2015) ‘Helen Clark: Speech at the UN Private Sector Forum’, 
www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/presscenter/speeches/2015/09/26/helen-clark-speech-
at-the-un-private-sector-forum.html (accessed 18 October 2016) 
Clinton, H.R. (2011) ‘Interview on Africa 360’, Diplomacy in Action, 11 June, Washington, 
DC: US Department of State / state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/ rm/2011/06/165941.htm 
(accessed 7 June 2015) 
Cooksey, B. (2012) Politics, Patronage and Projects: The Political Economy of Agricultural 
Policy in Tanzania, Future Agricultures Consortium (FAC), Brighton: IDS 
Crump, L. (2015) ‘Analyzing Complex Negotiations’, Negotiation Journal 31.2: 131–53 
Deininger, K. and Byerlee, D. (2011) Rising Global Interest in Farmland: Sustainable and 
Equitable Benefits?, Washington DC: World Bank 
Ebner, A. (2009) ‘Entrepreneurial State: The Schumpeterian Theory of Industrial Policy and 
the East Asian “Miracle”’, in U. Cantner, J.-L. Gaffard, and L. Nesta (eds), Schumpeterian 
Perspectives on Innovation, Competition and Growth, Berlin: Springer 
Ehrbeck, T. (2014) ‘Private Sector Stepping Up Leadership in Financial Inclusion’, CGAP 
Blog, 28 January 2014, www.cgap.org/blog/ (accessed 1 November 2016) 
Elster, J. (1985) Making Sense of Marx, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
64 
Evans, P. (2011) ‘Constructing the 21st Century Developmental State’, in O. Edigheji (ed.), 
Constructing a Democratic Developmental State in South Africa: Potentials and Challenges, 
Cape Town: Human Sciences Research Council 
Evans, P. (1996) ‘Introduction: Development Strategies across the Public-Private Divide’, 
World Development 24.6: 1033–37 
Evans, P. (1995) Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press 
Evans, P.B. (1989) ‘Predatory, Developmental and Other Apparatuses: A Comparative 
Political Economy Perspective on the Third World State’, Sociological Forum 4.4: 561–87 
Evans, P. and Rauch, J. (1999) ‘Bureaucracy and Growth: A Cross-National Analysis of the 
Effects of “Weberian” State Structures on Economic Growth’, American Sociological Review 
64.5: 748–65 
Faust, J.R.G. (2004) ‘Latin America, Chile and East Asia: Policy-Networks and Successful 
Diversification’, Journal of Latin American Studies 36.4: 743–70 
Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (2010) Growth and Transformation Plan 2010/11 –
2014/15, Addis Ababa: Ministry of Finance and Economic Development 
Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (1995) The Constitution of the Federal Democratic 
Republic of Ethiopia, Proclamation No 1/1995, Addis Ababa: Federal Democratic Republic of 
Ethiopia 
Ferraro, C. and Stumpo, G. (2010) Políticas de apoyo a las pymes en América Latina: Entre 
avances innovadores y desafíos institucionales, Santiago, Chile: Comisión Económica para 
América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL) 
Fortin, C. (2015) ‘Debate in the US on Trans Pacific Partnership: Issues and Warnings’, IDS 
Blog, 19 June 2015, www.ids.ac.uk/opinion/debate-in-the-us-on-trans-pacific-partnership-
issues-and-warnings (accessed 3 October 2016) 
Fortin, C. (2014) ‘The International Trade Regime at a Crossroads? From Liberalisation to 
Global Regulation’, IDS Globalisation and Development Blog, 23 January 2014, 
www.globalisationanddevelopment.com/2014/01/the-international-trade-regime-at.html 
(accessed 26 October 2016) 
Foucault, M. (1991) Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, New York: Vintage Books 
Friedman, T. (1999) The Lexus and the Olive Tree, New York: Anchor Books 
Fuchs, D. and Lederer, M.M.L (2007) The Power of Business, Business Power and Global 
Governance, Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner 
Fukuyama, F. (1992) The End of History and the Last Man, London: Penguin 
Gebreeyesus, M. and Lizuka, M. (2010) Discovery of the Flower Industry in Ethiopia: 
Experimentation and Coordination, UNU-MERIT Working Paper Series 2010-025, UNU-
MERIT 
GoI (2014) A National Mission on Financial Inclusion, Pradhan Mantri Jan-Dhan Yojana, 
Department of Financial Services, Ministry of Finance, Government of India 
65 
Gramsci, A.; Forgacs, D. and Hobsbawm, E. (1998) The Gramsci Reader: Selected Writings, 
1916–1935, New York: New York University Press 
Gu, J. (2011) The Last Golden Land? Chinese Private Companies Go to Africa, IDS Working 
Paper 365, Brighton: Institute of Development Studies 
Gu, J. (2009) ‘China’s Private Enterprises in Africa and the Implications for African 
Development’, European Journal of Development Research 21.4 
Gu, J. and Carty, A. (2014) ‘China and African Development: Partnership not Mentoring’, IDS 
Bulletin Special Issue: China and International Development 45.4: 57–69 
Gu, J.; Zhang, Y. and Chen, Y. (2014) ‘Understanding China’s Approaches to International 
Development’, IDS Policy Briefing 75, Brighton: IDS 
Gu, J. and Schiere, R. (2011) ‘Post-Crisis Prospects for China-Africa Relations’, in R. 
Schiere and L. Ndikumana (eds), China as an Emerging Partner for Africa, Tunis: African 
Development Bank 
Gu, J.; Chuanhong, Z.; Vaz, A. and Mukwereza, L. (2016) ‘Chinese State Capitalism? 
Rethinking the Role of the State and Business in Chinese Development Cooperation in 
Africa’, World Development: China and Brazil in African Agriculture 81, May Issue: 24–34 
Haggard, S.M. (1997) ‘Business, Politics and Policy in East and Southeast Asia’, in H.S. 
Rowan (ed.), Behind East Asian Growth: The Political and Social Foundations of Prosperity, 
London: Routledge 
Haggard, S.; Sylvia, M. and Schneider, B.R. (1997) ‘Theories of Business and Business-
State Relations’, in S. Maxfield and B.R. Schneider (eds), Business and the State in 
Developing Countries, Ithaca: Cornell University Press 
Hall, P. and Soskice, D. (2001) ‘An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism’, in P. Hall and D. 
Soskice (eds), Varieties Of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative 
Advantage, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Hancké, B. (2009) ‘Introducing the Debate’, in B. Hancké (ed.), Debating Varieties of 
Capitalism: A Reader, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Hausmann, R. and Rodrik, D. (2003) ‘Economic Development as Self-discovery’, Journal of 
Development Economics 72.2: 603–33 
Hayashi, S. (2010) ‘The Developmental State in the Era of Globalization: Beyond the 
Northeast Asian Model of Political Economy’, The Pacific Review 23.1: 45–69 
Headey, D. (2012) ‘Turning Economic Growth into Nutrition-Sensitive Growth’, in S. Fan and 
R. Pandya-Lorch (eds), Reshaping Agriculture for Nutrition and Health, Washington DC: 
IFPRI, www.ifpri.org/publication/turning-economic-growth-nutrition-sensitive-growth-1 
(accessed 1 November 2016) 
Herreros, S. (2010) ‘Chile’, in A. Capling and P. Low (eds), Government, Non-State Actors 
and Trade Policy Making: Negotiating Preferentially or Multilaterally, New York: CUP 
Hoddinott, J.; Gillespie, S. and Yosef, S. (2015) Public-Private Partnerships and the 
Reduction of Undernutrition in Developing Countries, Washington DC: IFPRI 
66 
Humphrey, J.; Spratt, S.; Thorpe, J. and Henson, S. (2014) Understanding and Enhancing 
the Role of Business in International Development: A Conceptual Framework and Agenda for 
Research, IDS Working Paper 440, Brighton: IDS 
Hyvonen, M. and Wang, H. (2012) ‘India’s Services Exports’, Reserve Bank of Australia 
Bulletin, December 2012: 33–38 
IDS (2015) Engaged Excellence for Global Development: Strategy 2015–20, Brighton: IDS 
IPPG (2010) Beyond Institutions: Institutions and Organizations in the Politics and 
Economics of Poverty Reduction – a Thematic Synthesis of Research Evidence, 
Manchester: Research Programme Consortium on Improving Institutions for Pro-Poor 
Growth 
Jenkins, R. (2013) Transnational Corporations and Uneven Development: The 
Internationalization of Capital and the Third World, New York: Routledge 
Jessop, B. (2001) ‘Bringing the State Back In (Yet Again): Reviews, Revisions, Rejections, 
and Redirections’, International Review of Sociology 11.2: 149–73 
Johnson, C. (1999) ‘The Developmental State: Odyssey of a Concept’, in M. Woo-Cumings 
(ed.), The Developmental State, Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press 
Johnson, C. (1987) ‘Political Institutions and Economic Performance: the Government 
Business Relationship in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan’, in F.C. Deyo (ed.), The Political 
Economy of the New Asian Industrialisation, Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press 
Johnson, C. (1982) MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925–
1975, Stanford: Stanford University Press 
Justino, P. and Moore, M. (2015) Inequality: Trends, Harms and New Agendas, IDS 
Evidence Report 144, Brighton: IDS 
Keeley, J.; Seide, W.M.; Eid, A. and Kidewa, A.L. (2014) Large-scale Land Deals in Ethiopia: 
Sale, Trends, Features and Outcomes To Date, London: IDRC and IIED 
Kennedy, G. (2009) ‘A Reply to Daniel Klein on Adam Smith and the Invisible Hand’, Econ 
Journal Watch, 6.3: 374–88 
Kurtz, M. (2001) ‘State Developmentalism without a Developmental State: The Public 
Foundations of the “Free Market Miracle” in Chile’, Latin American Politics and Society 43.2: 
1–26 
Lemma, A. and Te Velde, D.W. (2015) State-Business Relations as Drivers of Economic 
Performance, WIDER Working Paper 2015/098, Helsinki: KOICA/UNU-WIDER 
Leftwich, A. (2010) ‘Beyond Institutions: Rethinking the Role of Leaders, Elites and Coalitions 
in the Industrial Formation of Developmental States and Strategies’, Forum for Development 
Studies 37.1: 93–111 
Leftwich, A. (2009) Analysing the Politics of State-Business Relations: A Methodological 
Concept Note on the Historical Institutionalist Approach, IPPG Discussion Paper Series 23A, 
Manchester: Research Programme Consortium on Improving Institutions for Pro-Poor 
Growth 
Leftwich, A. (2000) States of Development: On the Primacy of Politics in Development, 
Cambridge: Polity Press 
67 
Lewicki, R.; Saunders, D. and Barry, B. (2010) Negotiation: Readings, Exercises and Cases, 
New York: McGraw-Hill 
Lin, L. and Milhaupt, C. (2013) ‘We are the (National) Champions: Understanding the 
Mechanisms of State Capitalism in China’, Stanford Law Review 65: 697–759 
Lindblom, C. (1977) Politics and Markets: The World’s Political Economic Systems, New 
York: Basic Books 
List, F. (1885/2011) The National System of Political Economy: The History Three Volumes 
in One, New York: Cosimo Classics 
Mader, P. (2016) Questioning Three Fundamental Assumptions in Financial Inclusion, IDS 
Evidence Report 176, Brighton: IDS 
Mader, P. (2015) The Political Economy of Microfinance: Financializing Poverty, London: 
Palgrave 
Mader, P. (2013) ‘Rise and Fall of Microfinance in India: The Andhra Pradesh Crisis in 
Perspective’, Strategic Change 22.1–2: 47–66 
Maestre, M.; Robinson, E.; Humphrey, J. and Henson, S. (2014) The Role of Business in 
Providing Nutrient-Rich Foods for the Poor: A Case Study in Tanzania, IDS Evidence Report 
52, Brighton: IDS 
Marx, K. (1990) Capital: Critique of Political Economy, Volume 1, London: Penguin Classics 
Marx, K. and Engels, F. (2004) The German Ideology (edited, with an Introduction, by C.J. 
Arthur), New York: International Publishers 
Mayntz, R. and Scharpf, F. (1995) ‘Der Ansatz des akteurzentrierten Institutionalismus’, in  
R. Mayntz and F. Scharpf (eds), Gesellschaftliche Selbstregelung und Politische Steuerung, 
Frankfurt: Campus 
Mazzucato, M. (2013) The Entrepreneurial State, London: Anthem Press 
Mihretu, M. and Tolina, E.T. (2015) ‘Ethiopian Public Private Consultation Forum (EPPCF)’, 
presented at the Public–Private Dialog 2015 Workshop, Copenhagen, 10–13 March 2015 
Ministry of Health and Social Welfare (2011) National Nutrition Strategy 2012–2015, 
Dodoma: Ministry of Health and Social Welfare 
Mkandawire, T. (2001) ‘Thinking about Developmental States in Africa’, Cambridge Journal 
of Economics 25.3: 289–313 
Moore, M. (2005) ‘Methods of Analysing Power: Consultant’s Report on Published Studies, 
Principally on Burkina Faso and Ethiopia’, in Methods of Analysing Power – A Workshop 
Report, Stockholm: SIDA 
Murdoch, J. and Marsden, T. (1994) ‘The Spatialization of Politics: Local and National Actor-
Spaces in Environmental Conflict’, Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 20.3: 
368–80 
Nair, T. and Tankha, A. (2015) Inclusive Finance India Report 2014, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 
68 
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) [Tanzania] and ICF Macro (2011) Tanzania Demographic 
and Health Survey 2010, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania: NBS and ICF Macro 
Nathan Associates (2013) Re-Prioritizing Priority Sector Lending in India: Impact of Priority 
Sector Lending on India’s Commercial Banks, Economic Impact Analysis, December 2013, 
www.nathaninc.com/sites/default/files/Priority_Sector_Lending_India.pdf (accessed            
18 October 2016) 
Nelson, R.C. (2007) ‘Transnational Strategic Networks and Policymaking in Chile: CORFO’s 
High Technology Investment Promotion Program’, Latin American Politics & Society 49.2: 
149–81 
Nölke, A. and Vliegenhart, A. (2009) ‘Enlarging the Varieties of Capitalism: The Emergence 
of Dependent Market Economies in East Central Europe’, World Politics 61.4: 670–702 
Oakland Institute (2011) Understanding Land Investment Deals in Africa, Country Report: 
Ethiopia, Oakland: Oakland Institute 
Oqubay, A. (2015) Made in Africa: Industrial Policy in Ethiopia, Oxford Scholarship Online 
Perez-Aleman, P. (2003) ‘A Learning-centred View of Business Associations: Building 
Business-Government Relations for Development’, Business and Politics 5.2: 193–213 
Perez-Aleman, P. (2000) ‘Learning, Adjustment and Economic Development: Transforming 
Firms, the State and Associations in Chile’, World Development 28.1: 41–55 
Polanyi, K. (2001) The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our 
Time, Boston: Beacon Press 
Putzel, J. (2002) ‘Developmental States and Crony Capitalists’, in P.P. Masina (ed.), 
Rethinking Development in East Asia, Richmond, Surrey: Curzon Press 
Qureshi, M. and Te Velde, W. (2013) ‘State-business Relations, Investment Climate and 
Firm Productivity in Sub-Saharan Africa’, Journal of International Development 25: 912–35 
Rahmato, D. (2014) ‘The Perils of Development from Above: Land Deals in Ethiopia’, African 
Studies 12.1: 26–44 
Rivas, G. (2012) La experiencia de CORFO y la transformación productiva de Chile: 
‘Evolución, Aprendizaje y Lecciones de Desarrollo, Serie Políticas Públicas y Transformación 
Productiva 3, Corporación Andina de Fomento 
Robinson, E. and Nyagaya, M. (2014) ‘Ensuring that Food Fortification Will Reach the Poor 
in Tanzania’, IDS Policy Briefing 72, Brighton: IDS 
Robinson, E. and Pittore, K. (2015) Food, Markets and Nutrition: Maximising the Impacts of 
Private Sector Engagement in Tanzania. Case Studies and Key Messages from the 
Workshop, IDS Evidence Report 141, Brighton: IDS 
Robinson, E.; Temu, A.; Waized, B.; Ndyetabula, D.; Humphrey, J. and Henson, S. (2014) 
Policy Options to Enhance Markets for Nutrient-Dense Foods in Tanzania, IDS Evidence 
Report 90, Brighton: IDS 
Rodrik, D. (2013) The Past, Present, and Future of Economic Growth, Global Citizen 
Foundation Working Paper 1, Global Citizen Foundation 
69 
Routley, L. (2014) ‘Developmental States in Africa? A Review of the Ongoing Debates and 
Buzzwords’, Development Policy Review 32.2: 159–77 
Routley, L. (2012) Developmental States: A Review of the Literature, ESID Working Paper 3, 
Manchester: University of Manchester 
Rozas, D. and Sinha, S. (2010) ‘Avoiding a Microfinance Bubble in India: Is Self-Regulation 
the Answer?’, Microfinance News, 10 January 
Sa-Dhan (2015) The Bharat Microfinance Report 2015, New Delhi: Sa-Dhan, The 
Association of Community Development Finance Institutions 
Scharpf, F. (1997) Games Real Actors Play: Actor-centred Institutionalism in Policy 
Research, Boulder CO: Westview 
Schmidt, H.; Gostin, L. and Emanuel, E. (2015) ‘Public Health, Universal Health Coverage, 
and Sustainable Development Goals: Can They Coexist?’, The Lancet, 386.9996: 928–30 
Schmidt, V. (2012) ‘What Happened to the State-Influenced Market Economies (SMEs)? 
France, Italy, and Spain Confront the Crisis as the Good, the Bad, and the Ugly’, in W. Grant 
and G. Wilson (eds), The Consequences of the Global Financial Crisis: The Rhetoric of 
Reform and Regulation, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Schmidt, V. (2009) ‘Putting the Political Back into Political Economy by Bringing the State 
Back in Yet Again’, World Politics 61.3: 516–46 
Schneider, B.R. (2009) ‘Hierarchical Market Economies and Varieties of Capitalism in Latin 
America’, Journal of Latin American Studies 41.3: 553–75 
Schumpeter, J.A. (2003) [1942] Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, London and New 
York: Routledge 
Sen, K. (2015) State-Business Relations: Topic Guide, Birmingham, UK: GSDRC, University 
of Birmingham 
Sen, K. and Te Velde, D.W. (2009) ‘State Business Relations and Economic Growth in Sub-
Saharan Africa’, Journal of Development Studies 45.8: 1267–83 
Shimizu, S. (2010) ‘The State of the Indian Banking Sector and its Role in India’s High 
Growth’, Pacific Business and Industries X.36: 2–36 
SIDA (2004) Ethiopia: Economic Performance and the Role of the Private Sector, Country 
Economic Report 2004:4, Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, 
www.sida.se/English/publications/Publication_database/publications-by-
year1/2004/november/ethiopia-economic-performance-and-the-role-of-the-private-sector/ 
(accessed 18 October 2016) 
Smith, A. (1976) [1776] An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, Vol. 
1, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Taylor, M. (2011) ‘Freedom from Poverty is Not for Free: Rural Development and the 
Microfinance Crisis in Andhra Pradesh, India’, Journal of Agrarian Change 11: 484–504 
Taylor, S.D. (2012) ‘Influence without Organizations: State-Business Relations and their 
Impact on Business Environments in Contemporary Africa’, Business and Politics 14.1: 1–38 
70 
Te Velde, D.W. (2009) Analysing the Economics of State-Business Relations: A Summary 
Guide, IPPG Discussion Paper Series 23B, Manchester: Research Programme Consortium 
on Improving Institutions for Pro-Poor Growth 
Te Velde, D.W. and Leftwich, A. (2010) State-Business Relations and Economic Growth in 
sub-Saharan Africa: A Review of Case Studies in Ghana, Mauritius, South Africa and 
Zambia, Manchester: Research Programme Consortium on Improving Institutions for Pro-
Poor Growth (IPPG), September 2010, www.ippg.org.uk/papers/dp48.pdf (accessed           
18 October 2016) 
Teki, S. and Mishra, R.K. (2012) Microfinance & Financial Inclusion, New Delhi: Academic 
Foundation 
Temu, A.; Waized, B.; Ndyetabula, D.; Robinson, E.; Humphrey, J. and Henson, S. (2014) 
Mapping Value Chains for Nutrient-Dense Foods in Tanzania, IDS Evidence Report 76, 
Brighton: IDS 
Turnell, S. (2005) The Rise and Fall of Cooperative Credit in Colonial Burma, Research 
Paper 0509, Department of Economics, Macquarie University 
UNDP (2013) An Assessment of Operation and Performance of Commercial Farmers in 
Ethiopia, www.et.undp.org (accessed 18 October 2016) 
Unsworth, S. (2010) An Upside-down View of Governance, Centre for the Future State, 
Brighton: IDS 
Unsworth, S. and Moore, M. (2010) Societies, States and Citizens: A Policymaker’s Guide to 
the Research, Centre for the Future State, Brighton: IDS 
Venkatesan, J. (2015) ‘A Bank Account for Mary’, The Hindu, 17 August 
Viner, J. (1927) ‘Adam Smith and Laissez-Faire’, Journal of Political Economy 35.2: 198–232 
Waage, J.; Yap, C.; Bell, S.; Levy, C.; Mace, G.; Pegram, T. and Unterhalter, E. (2015) 
‘Governing the UN Sustainable Development Goals: Interactions, Infrastructures, and 
Institutions’, The Lancet Global Health 3.5: 251–52 
Weber, M. (1978) Economy and Society, Vol. 1, Berkeley CA: University of California Press 
Weiss, L. (1995) ‘Governed Interdependence: Rethinking the Government‐Business 
Relationship in East Asia’, The Pacific Review 8.4: 589–616 
White, G. and Wade, R. (1984) ‘Developmental States in East Asia: Editorial Introduction’, 
IDS Bulletin 15.2: 1–3, http://bulletin.ids.ac.uk/idsbo/issue/view/158 (accessed 1 November 
2016) 
Wichterich, C. (2012) ‘The Other Financial Crisis: Growth and Crash of the Microfinance 
Sector in India’, Development 55: 406–12 
Witt, M. and Redding, G. (2013) ‘Asian Business Systems: Institutional Comparison, Clusters 
and Implications for Varieties of Capitalism and Business Systems Theory’, Socio-Economic 
Review 11.2: 265–300 
Woo-Cumings, M. (1999) Introduction: Chalmers Johnson and the Politics of Nationalism and 
Development, in M. Woo-Cumings (ed.), The Developmental State, Ithaca, New York: 
Cornell University Press 
71 
World Bank (2016) Ethiopia’s Great Run: The Growth Acceleration and How to Pace It, 
World Bank Group, 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/693561467988949839/pdf/99399-REVISED-
PUBLIC-thiopia-Economic-Update-2-11-16-web.pdf (accessed 18 October 2016) 
World Bank (2009) Action Plan Provision of Vitamins and Minerals to the Tanzanian 
Population through the Enrichment of Staple Foods: Reviewed and Adopted by the High 
Level Forum Called by the Government of Tanzania on 10 September 2009, Washington 
DC: World Bank 
World Bank (2004) Beyond Economic Growth: An Introduction to Sustainable Development, 
Washington DC: World Bank 
Brighton BN1 9RE 
T +44 (0)1273 606261 
F +44 (0)1273 621202 
E ids@ids.ac.uk
www.ids.ac.uk
IDS_Master Logo
